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PLEA BARGAINING IN THE DARK:  THE DUTY 
TO DISCLOSE EXCULPATORY BRADY EVIDENCE 
DURING PLEA BARGAINING 
Michael Nasser Petegorsky* 
 
Ninety-seven percent of federal convictions are the result of guilty pleas.  
Despite the criminal justice system’s reliance on plea bargaining, the law 
regarding the prosecution’s duty to disclose certain evidence during this 
stage of the judicial process is unsettled.  The Supreme Court’s decision in 
Brady v. Maryland requires the prosecution to disclose evidence that 
establishes the defendant’s factual innocence during a trial.  Some courts 
apply this rule during plea bargaining and require the disclosure of 
material exculpatory evidence before the entry of a guilty plea.  Other 
courts have held or suggested that the prosecution may suppress 
exculpatory evidence during plea bargaining, forcing the defendant to 
negotiate and determine whether to accept a plea offer or proceed to trial 
without it.  Substantial disparities therefore exist in the bargaining power 
and decision-making ability of criminal defendants, depending on where 
they are charged. 
This Note addresses the divide in how courts approach Brady challenges 
to guilty pleas.  After analyzing the development of plea bargaining and the 
Brady rule, this Note concludes that a guilty plea is not valid if made 
without awareness of material exculpatory evidence possessed by the 
prosecution.  To provide additional support for the recognition of pre–
guilty plea exculpatory Brady rights, this Note presents a case study of two 
2012 Supreme Court decisions establishing the right to effective assistance 
of counsel during plea bargaining, and argues that the same justifications 
for recognizing that right during plea bargaining apply to Brady as well. 
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“And it would be foolish to think that ‘constitutional’ rules governing 
counsel’s behavior will not be followed by rules governing the 
prosecution’s behavior in the plea-bargaining process that the Court today 
announces ‘is the criminal justice system.’”1 
INTRODUCTION 
A grocery store clerk is robbed at gunpoint on a Friday night, and two 
hours later police arrest twenty-four year old Chris, who lives nearby.2  
Chris is charged in the robbery, and two weeks before his trial is set to start, 
Chris and the prosecutor meet to discuss a guilty plea.  Chris maintains his 
innocence, but the prosecutor tells Chris that she has video surveillance 
footage of the robbery showing a masked robber matching his medium 
build, and a search of his apartment revealed a drawer full of cash and a 
gun.  The prosecutor says that if he agrees to plead guilty, she will reduce 
the charges and recommend only a one-year prison sentence.  However, if 
Chris refuses to plead guilty, the prosecutor threatens to charge him with 
the highest degree of armed robbery, in addition to a slew of other charges.  
Furthermore, she says she will recommend the maximum sentence for every 
charge, totaling over twenty years in prison.  Wishing to avoid the 
possibility of such a harsh sentence, Chris pleads guilty. 
While in prison, Chris discovers that the police arrested another man five 
miles away from the grocery store on the night of the robbery for driving 
while intoxicated.  In his car, this man had a mask matching the one in the 
surveillance video and a large amount of cash, with no explanation of where 
he got the money.  Chris believes that this evidence casts doubt on his guilt, 
and would not have pled guilty had he known about it, so he files a petition 
for a writ of habeas corpus to have his guilty plea vacated.  Whether or not 
Chris has the ability to challenge his plea, however, depends entirely on 
where his trial took place.  In some jurisdictions, Chris could have his guilty 
plea vacated if the court found that the prosecution failed to disclose 
 
 1. Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1376, 1392 (2012) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 2. The facts described in this Introduction are hypothetical. 
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evidence establishing his factual innocence.  In others, the prosecution has 
no such duty of disclosure, and Chris would be forced to serve his sentence, 
unable to challenge his plea.  The evidence of the other man’s arrest would 
have been disclosed at trial in any jurisdiction, but Chris waived his right to 
trial when he was confronted with the evidence against him and the threat 
of a severe prison sentence. 
While a full criminal trial has long been considered the “gold standard of 
American justice,”3 the criminal justice system is now primarily a system of 
pleas.4  In 2009, 97 percent of federal convictions and 94 percent of state 
convictions were obtained through guilty pleas.5  Despite that shift, some 
constitutional protections afforded to defendants at trial have not been 
applied during plea bargaining.  One traditionally trial-based right that has 
not been extended to plea bargaining is Brady disclosure.6  Under the Brady 
rule, the prosecution’s failure to disclose at trial any exculpatory or 
impeachment evidence that is material to punishment or guilt constitutes a 
violation of the defendant’s due process rights under the Fifth and 
Fourteenth Amendments.7  The Supreme Court has yet to recognize a 
similar disclosure duty during plea negotiations.8 
There is a circuit split on whether a defendant may raise a Brady 
violation to challenge a guilty plea for the failure to divulge material 
exculpatory evidence.9  In 2002, the Supreme Court held in United States v. 
Ruiz10 that a guilty plea could not be vacated due to the prosecution’s 
failure to disclose impeachment evidence.11  However, a dispute remains 
regarding whether a defendant may challenge a guilty plea for the 
prosecution’s suppression of material exculpatory evidence.12  Every 
subsequent circuit court decision regarding the duty to divulge exculpatory 
evidence during plea bargaining has been guided by each court’s own 
interpretation of Ruiz.13  These interpretations have led to opposing 
conclusions on whether the Brady rule applies to the disclosure of 
exculpatory evidence during plea bargaining.14 
This Note seeks to resolve the circuit split as to whether a defendant may 
raise a post–guilty plea exculpatory Brady challenge.  Part I introduces the 
Brady rule and outlines the current role of plea bargaining in the U.S. 
 
 3. Lafler, at 1398. 
 4. Stephanos Bibas, Incompetent Plea Bargaining and Extrajudicial Reforms, 
126 HARV. L. REV. 150, 151 (2012). 
 5. Missouri v. Frye, 132 S. Ct. 1399, 1407 (2012). 
 6. See Samuel R. Wiseman, Brady, Trust, and Error, 13 LOY. J. PUB. INT. L. 447, 459 
(2012). 
 7. See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 86 (1963). 
 8. United States v. Moussaoui, 591 F.3d 263, 286 (4th Cir. 2010). 
 9. Wiseman, supra note 6, at 458.  This Note will refer to such a challenge as an 
“exculpatory Brady challenge.” 
 10. 536 U.S. 622, 632 (2002). 
 11. United States v. Ruiz, 536 U.S. 622, 625 (2002). 
 12. See Samuel R. Wiseman, Waiving Innocence, 96 MINN. L. REV. 952, 992 (2012). 
 13. See infra Part II.C. 
 14. See Wiseman, supra note 6, at 458. 
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federal court system.  Part II details the circuit split regarding a defendant’s 
ability to challenge a guilty plea for failure to disclose exculpatory 
evidence, and discusses the Supreme Court’s decision in Ruiz regarding the 
prosecutor’s pre-plea duty to divulge impeachment evidence.  Part III 
presents an analogous case study of the Supreme Court’s recent extension 
of constitutional protections to plea bargaining in the context of the right to 
effective assistance of counsel.  In Part IV, this Note argues that the 
nondisclosure of exculpatory Brady evidence should automatically preclude 
a valid guilty plea.  Additionally, Part IV illustrates why the same principles 
that motivated the Supreme Court to extend effective assistance of counsel 
rights to guilty plea defendants support the pre-plea recognition of Brady. 
I.  DEVELOPMENT OF THE BRADY RULE AND PLEA BARGAINING 
The key to resolving the circuit split on the availability of a Brady 
challenge to contest a guilty plea is not a myopic focus on the evolution of 
Brady and its progeny.  Rather, this question is best addressed by also 
examining the current role of plea bargaining in the U.S. legal system and 
the ramifications of allowing or barring post-plea Brady challenges.  This 
part first introduces Brady v. Maryland15 and the evolution of the Brady 
rule.  It then discusses the process of plea bargaining and the function that 
process currently plays in the U.S. criminal justice system.  This part 
concludes by presenting policy reasons for and against allowing post–guilty 
plea exculpatory Brady challenges. 
A.  The Brady Rule 
In Brady, the Supreme Court held that the prosecution in a criminal trial 
has a duty to disclose evidence that is favorable to the defense and material 
to guilt or sentencing.16  This rule was not a stark departure from earlier 
jurisprudence; rather, it was a natural step in defining the rights afforded to 
a criminal defendant.17  Brady reflected an understanding that the role of 
the prosecutor is not purely adversarial, because the prosecutor “is the 
representative not of an ordinary party to a controversy, but of a sovereignty 
. . . whose interest . . . in a criminal prosecution is not that it shall win a 
case, but that justice shall be done.”18  In the eyes of the Supreme Court, the 
Brady rule helped perform the crucial function of ensuring that a criminal 
defendant was not deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process 
of law.19  The Supreme Court went on to define the contours of the Brady 
rule in a number of subsequent cases.  These cases defined what kinds of 
 
 15. 373 U.S. 83 (1963). 
 16. Id. at 87. 
 17. See Adam M. Harris, Note, Two Constitutional Wrongs Do Not Make a Right:  
Double Jeopardy and Prosecutorial Misconduct Under the Brady Doctrine, 28 CARDOZO L. 
REV. 931, 934–35 (2006). 
 18. Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935). 
 19. See Brady, 373 U.S. at 87; see also U.S. CONST. amends. V, XIV. 
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evidence had to be disclosed, the standard of materiality, and when Brady 
claims may be raised.20 
1.  The Duty To Disclose:  Brady v. Maryland 
The Brady rule defines one aspect of the prosecution’s evidentiary 
disclosure requirements during a criminal trial.  The Supreme Court first 
established a prosecutor’s constitutional obligations during discovery in 
Mooney v. Holohan, where the Court held that due process is violated if the 
government knowingly uses perjured testimony to obtain a conviction.21  
The duty pronounced in Mooney was further developed in Napue v. Illinois, 
where the Court overturned a conviction because the knowing use of 
perjured testimony may have affected the outcome of the trial.22 
The government’s discovery obligations coalesced into a distinct 
defendant’s right in Brady,23 where defendant John Brady and his 
companion Charles Boblit separately stood trial for the killing of a man 
during a robbery.24  Before trial, Brady’s attorney asked the prosecution to 
divulge Boblit’s extrajudicial statements.25  The prosecution provided 
Brady with some of the statements but withheld one in which Boblit 
admitted committing the actual homicide.26  At trial, Brady’s attorney 
conceded murder in the first degree and asked only that the jury return a 
verdict without a death sentence.27  Both Brady and Boblit, however, were 
sentenced to death.28 
The Supreme Court held that the government’s failure to divulge Boblit’s 
statement upon request violated Brady’s right to due process under the 
Fourteenth Amendment.29  The Court set out what became known as the 
Brady rule, which requires that the government provide the defendant any 
evidence at trial that is material to either guilt or punishment.30  The 
holding was not intended to punish to society or the prosecutor for any 
misdeeds, even if the suppression of evidence was willful.31  Rather, the 
holding in Brady came from the Court’s belief that a defendant could not be 
justly deprived of his life, liberty, or property, without being presented with 
all material, exculpatory evidence held by the prosecution.32  The Court 
further noted that society is served not only by the conviction of criminals 
 
 20. See, e.g., United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667 (1985); United States v. Agurs, 427 
U.S. 97 (1976); Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150 (1972). 
 21. Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103, 112 (1935). 
 22. Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264, 272 (1959). 
 23. 373 U.S. 83 (1963). 
 24. Id. at 84. 
 25. Id. 
 26. Id. 
 27. Id. 
 28. Id. 
 29. Id. at 86–87. 
 30. Id. at 87; see also Michael Serota, Stare Decisis and the Brady Doctrine, 5 HARV. L. 
& POL’Y REV. 415, 417 (2011). 
 31. See Brady, 373 U.S. at 87. 
 32. See id. at 87–88. 
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but also when trials are fair, and that “our system of the administration of 
justice suffers when any accused is treated unfairly.”33 
2.  Development of the Rule 
After Brady, the Supreme Court went on to define the contours of the 
prosecution’s disclosure obligations in a number of decisions.  While Brady 
was concerned with exculpatory evidence—information that the defense 
could use to prove the defendant’s innocence—in Giglio v. United States,34 
the Court considered the suppression of evidence that went to the 
impeachment of witnesses against the defendant.35 
The Court held in Giglio that where guilt or innocence may rest on the 
reliability of a witness, the suppression of evidence impugning that 
witness’s credibility violates due process.36  Giglio thus defined two types 
of material that must be disclosed under Brady:  impeachment evidence and 
exculpatory evidence.37  Impeachment evidence goes to the credibility of 
witnesses and may include evidence revealing that a witness has a bias or 
was offered leniency in exchange for testimony and cooperation.38  
Exculpatory evidence, on the other hand, establishes the factual innocence 
of the defendant, such as video footage of the crime or DNA left at the 
scene.39  Some evidence may be both exculpatory and impeaching, such as 
inconsistent statements from a witness regarding the perpetrator of a 
crime.40  Additionally, after Giglio the Supreme Court has traditionally 
treated exculpatory and impeachment evidence identically:  the analysis of a 
Brady violation has been the same whether the undisclosed evidence was 
impeachment or exculpatory.41  However, the equal treatment of 
impeachment and exculpatory evidence arguably changed after the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Ruiz, which some courts have viewed as creating a 
distinction between the two in the plea bargaining context.42 
The scope of the evidence required to be disclosed under Brady, and the 
situations in which it must be disclosed, has continued to expand after 
 
 33. Id. at 87. 
 34. 405 U.S. 150 (1972). 
 35. See id. at 154; see also Anne Bowen Poulin, Prosecutorial Inconsistency, Estoppel, 
and Due Process:  Making the Prosecution Get Its Story Straight, 89 CALIF. L. REV. 1423, 
1462 (2001). 
 36. Giglio, 405 U.S. at 154; see also Peter A. Joy & Kevin C. McMunigal, Implicit Plea 
Agreements and Brady Disclosure, 22 CRIM. JUST. 50 (2007) (discussing the scope of the 
Court’s holding in Giglio). 
 37. See John G. Douglass, Fatal Attraction?  The Uneasy Courtship of Brady and Plea 
Bargaining, 50 EMORY L.J. 437, 496 (2001). 
 38. R. Michael Cassidy, Plea Bargaining, Discovery, and the Intractable Problem of 
Impeachment Disclosures, 64 VAND. L. REV. 1429, 1437–38 (2011). 
 39. Douglass, supra note 37, at 480. 
 40. Cassidy, supra note 38, at 1438. 
 41. See United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 676 (1985) (“This Court has rejected any 
such distinction between impeachment evidence and exculpatory evidence.”). 
 42. See infra Part II.B. 
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Giglio.  In United States v. Agurs,43 the Supreme Court held that Brady 
material must be disclosed even in the absence of a specific request by the 
defendant.44  Agurs noted a subtle shift in the concerns of the Court:  while 
the Supreme Court in Brady’s predecessors was mainly concerned with 
misconduct or misrepresentation by prosecutors, the Court’s concern in 
Brady was the injury to the defendant resulting from the nondisclosure of 
material exculpatory evidence.45  With this focus, the question became how 
to determine materiality or when that injury violated due process.  The 
Court in Agurs found that, under Brady, “implicit in the requirement of 
materiality is a concern that the suppressed evidence might have affected 
the outcome of the trial.”46  The Supreme Court held that the standard of 
materiality must reflect the Court’s “overriding concern with the justice of 
the finding of guilt.”47  As guilt must be established beyond a reasonable 
doubt, the Court found that due process is violated if the undisclosed 
evidence creates a reasonable doubt that did not previously exist.48 
The Supreme Court further developed this standard of materiality in 
United States v. Bagley,49 where the Court held that evidence is material if 
“there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to 
the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different.  A 
‘reasonable probability’ is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence 
in the outcome.”50  Bagley’s standard of materiality—which continues to be 
applied in the Brady analysis today—was not derived solely from the Brady 
line of cases.51  Rather, the Court noted that this standard was used to 
determine whether due process was violated by the ineffective assistance of 
counsel in Strickland v. Washington.52  The Strickland line of cases 
concerns the actions of defense counsel rather than those of the prosecutor, 
but continues to share this materiality standard with Brady and its 
progeny.53 
B.  The Practice of Plea Bargaining 
Defendants at the plea bargaining stage of the judicial process have not 
traditionally been afforded the same constitutional protections as they 
receive at trial.  This discrepancy has become progressively more 
 
 43. 427 U.S. 97 (1976).  
 44. See id. at 110. 
 45. Id. at 104 n.10; see also Mark D. Villaverde, Note, Structuring the Prosecutor’s 
Duty To Search the Intelligence Community for Brady Material, 88 CORNELL L. REV. 1471, 
1484 (2003). 
 46. Agurs, 427 U.S. at 104. 
 47. Id. at 112.  The Court rejected the assertion that the standard of materiality should 
focus on the defendant’s ability to prepare for trial, instead of on the importance of the 
evidence to the determination of guilt or punishment. Id. at 112 n.20. 
 48. Id. at 112–13. 
 49. 473 U.S. 667 (1985). 
 50. Id. at 682.  
 51. See id. at 681–82. 
 52. See id. at 682; see also Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). 
 53. See infra notes 386–89, 419–21 and accompanying text. 
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problematic, as plea bargains have accounted for an ever-increasing 
percentage of the resolutions of criminal cases.  This section describes the 
development of plea bargaining and outlines the current role that plea 
bargaining plays in the federal court system.54 
1.  The Plea Bargaining Process 
While plea bargaining has long been a part of the criminal justice system, 
the Supreme Court only recognized it as a constitutional method of 
adjudicating criminal cases in the latter half of the twentieth century.55  
Despite the prior lack of constitutional grounding, plea bargaining has come 
to play a major role in the American judicial process.56  Plea bargaining 
occurs before the start of the trial and usually takes the form of a series of 
offers and counteroffers between a prosecuting attorney and the defendant 
and his attorney.57  There are two broad categories of plea negotiations, 
each of which generally entails concessions on the part of both the 
prosecution and the defendant:  charge bargaining and sentence 
bargaining.58  In charge bargaining, the defendant agrees to plead guilty in 
exchange for the dropping of some charges or the decrease in their 
severity.59  In sentence bargaining, the prosecution agrees to recommend a 
lesser sentence in return for the guilty plea.60  These categories are not 
mutually exclusive, and many plea agreements will contain elements of 
both.61  In both types of negotiation, the exchange is essentially one in 
which the defendant waives his customary trial rights,62 and the prosecution 
makes a recommendation to the judge.63  However, the judge is not 
required to follow the recommendation of the prosecution and may decide 
not to accept a guilty plea.64 
 
 54. The question whether plea bargaining is beneficial or detrimental to the U.S. judicial 
system is beyond the scope of this Note.  For an argument that plea bargaining should be 
eliminated, see Stephen J. Schulhofer, Plea Bargaining As Disaster, 101 YALE L.J. 1979 
(1992).  For a defense of plea bargaining, see Frank Easterbrook, Plea Bargaining As 
Compromise, 101 YALE L.J. 1969 (1992). 
 55. CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ANDREW D. LEIPOLD, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND 
PROCEDURE:  CRIMINAL § 180 (4th ed. 2008). 
 56. See Missouri v. Frye, 132 S. Ct. 1399, 1407 (2012). 
 57. See STEPHEN A. SALTZBURG & DANIEL J. CAPRA, AMERICAN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE:  
CASES AND COMMENTARY 1036 (7th ed. 2004). 
 58. Id. 
 59. Id.; see also FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(c)(1)(A). 
 60. See Frye, 132 S. Ct. at 1407; see also FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(c)(1)(B)–(C). 
 61. See Joseph A. Colquitt, Ad Hoc Plea Bargaining, 75 TUL. L. REV. 695, 702–03 
(2001). 
 62. These waived trial rights include the privilege against self-incrimination and the 
right to confront his accusers, present witnesses, and testify on his own behalf. See FED. R. 
CRIM. P. 11(b)(1). 
 63. See Colquitt, supra note 61, at 701–03; see also Lynch v. Overholser, 369 U.S. 705, 
719 (1962). 
 64. See Colquitt, supra note 61, at 697. 
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Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure provides guidelines 
for the entry of a guilty plea.65  Before a guilty plea is accepted, the 
defendant must appear in court, and the court must be sure that the 
defendant understands his rights and the consequences of entering a guilty 
plea.66  Courts interpreting this section of Rule 11 have referred to this as 
the requirement that a guilty plea be entered “knowingly.”67  The court 
must also determine that a guilty plea was given voluntarily68 and that there 
was a “factual basis” for the plea.69  These determinations are made during 
a plea colloquy, where the court informs the defendant of his rights and the 
consequences of his plea and attempts to determine whether the defendant 
is acting knowingly and voluntarily.70  If the requirements of Rule 11 are 
met, the court may accept a guilty plea.71 
While Rule 11 provides the basic framework for guilty plea consideration 
in the courts, the Supreme Court has discussed and elaborated upon Rule 
11’s requirements in a number of cases reviewing the validity of guilty 
pleas.  Rather than treating “knowing” and “voluntary” as two separate 
criteria, the Court generally treats them as one requirement, asking whether 
a guilty plea meets the “knowing and voluntary” standard.72 
In addition to expanding on the knowing and voluntary requirement, the 
Supreme Court has also defined the context in which this requirement 
applies and other characteristics of the plea bargaining process.  In 
McCarthy v. United States,73 the Court held that if a court does not 
expressly confirm that a defendant’s guilty plea is both knowing and 
voluntary, the plea is void.74  For a guilty plea to be knowing and voluntary, 
the court must determine that the conduct admitted actually constitutes the 
offense charged.75  A defendant must understand the nature of the crime of 
which he is accused and how that law relates to the factual occurrences to 
which he admits.76  The Court also noted that, although plea bargaining 
itself is not constitutionally mandated, a finding that the guilty plea was 
 
 65. FED. R. CRIM. P. 11. 
 66. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(b)(1). 
 67. See, e.g., Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 248 (1969). 
 68. FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(b)(2). 
 69. FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(b)(3). 
 70. See Gabriel J. Chin & Richard W. Holmes, Jr., Effective Assistance of Counsel and 
the Consequences of Guilty Pleas, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 697, 727 (2002). 
 71. FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(c)(3). 
 72. See, e.g., Puckett v. United States, 556 U.S. 129, 136 (2009).  The term “intelligent” 
is also sometimes part of the standard for validity of a guilty plea, either in place of 
“knowing” or as a third requirement. See, e.g., Bradshaw v. Stumpf, 545 U.S. 175, 183 
(2005). 
 73. 394 U.S. 459 (1969). 
 74. See id. at 466–67.  
 75. See id. at 467. 
 76. See id. at 466–67.  This rule was later expanded to require that a defendant 
understand the rights he waives by pleading guilty and be fully aware of the nature of the 
charges against him. Henderson v. Morgan, 426 U.S. 637, 644–45 (1976).  In Henderson, the 
plea was found to be involuntary because the defendant was never informed that intent to 
cause death was an element of second-degree murder. Id. at 645–46. 
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“truly voluntary” is constitutionally required.77  By pleading guilty, a 
defendant waives numerous constitutional rights;78 for that waiver to be 
valid under the Due Process Clause, the guilty plea must be knowing and 
voluntary.79 
In addition to establishing the constitutional requirement that a guilty 
plea be knowing and voluntary, the Court in McCarthy also held that an 
improperly entered guilty plea must be vacated, and the case remanded for 
new pleadings.80  The Court reasoned that vacating and remanding was the 
only way to guarantee that a defendant is afforded due process and the 
procedural safeguards it entails.81  Moreover, this rule prevents the waste of 
judicial resources on frivolous attacks of guilty plea convictions where the 
original record is inadequate.82 
A few months after McCarthy, the Court took the knowing and voluntary 
requirement a step further in Boykin v. Alabama.83  The Court held that 
because a guilty plea is effectively a waiver of multiple constitutional 
rights, such a waiver cannot be presumed from a silent record.84  Rather, a 
defendant must make an affirmative showing that he understands the nature 
of the charges against him and the waiver that the guilty plea entails, and 
wishes to waive those constitutional rights.85  If a guilty plea is not “equally 
voluntary and knowing, it has been obtained in violation of due process and 
is therefore void.”86 
While the system of plea bargaining in the United States has been met 
with criticism,87 the Supreme Court affirmed the constitutionality of the 
practice in a later and unrelated Brady case, Brady v. United States.88  The 
Court noted that plea bargaining has substantial benefits for both the 
defendant and the prosecution.89  For the defendant, a guilty plea is an 
opportunity to receive a lesser punishment than he might receive after a full 
 
 77. McCarthy, 394 U.S. at 466. 
 78. These rights include the privilege against self-incrimination, the right to a jury trial, 
and the right to confront his accusers. Id. 
 79. See id. (“For this waiver to be valid under the Due Process Clause, it must be ‘an 
intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege.’” (quoting Johnson 
v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938))). 
 80. See id. at 469. 
 81. Id. at 472.  The Court noted that a postconviction voluntariness hearing would be 
especially problematic in cases like the one at bar. Id. at 470–71.  Here, the crime required a 
“knowing and willful” attempt to commit tax fraud. Id. at 470.  At his sentencing hearing, 
the defendant stated that his acts were “neglectful” and “inadvertent,” but also stated that he 
was pleading guilty with full understanding of the charges and of his own volition. Id.  Thus, 
the record would have been insufficient to determine whether the plea was actually knowing 
and voluntary; pleading anew would be a more just and efficient remedy. See id. at 471. 
 82. See id. at 472. 
 83. 395 U.S. 238 (1969). 
 84. Id. at 243. 
 85. See id. at 242. 
 86. Id. at 243 n.5. 
 87. See SALTZBURG, supra note 57, at 1041. 
 88. 397 U.S. 742 (1970). 
 89. See id. at 752–53. 
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trial, and the costs and burdens of trial are eliminated.90  The government 
benefits by achieving its goals of punishment and deterrence and from 
saving the judicial resources normally expended at trial.91  In light of these 
benefits, the Court reaffirmed the holdings of Boykin and McCarthy, 
holding that a guilty plea is constitutionally valid only if it is knowing and 
voluntary.92  However, the Court also held that a defendant does not need to 
have an accurate assessment of the prosecution’s case in order for a plea to 
be knowing and voluntary.93 
Rule 11 also sets the basic parameters for withdrawal of, or challenges to, 
a guilty plea.94  A defendant may withdraw a guilty plea without 
justification before the court has accepted the plea.95  Once the court has 
accepted the plea, however, withdrawal becomes more difficult.  After the 
court has accepted the plea but before sentencing, a defendant may 
withdraw his plea if the court rejects the plea agreement or the defendant 
“can show a fair and just reason for requesting the withdrawal.”96  A guilty 
plea cannot be withdrawn after sentencing and may be set aside only by 
direct appeal or collateral attack, such as a petition for a writ of habeas 
corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2255.97  However, most guilty plea agreements 
include an express waiver of the right to appeal.98 
Additionally, the Supreme Court has limited the challenges available 
under habeas review.99  In Tollett v. Henderson,100 the Court held that a 
guilty plea precludes habeas review of nonjurisdictional “independent 
claims relating to the deprivation of constitutional rights that occurred prior 
to the entry of the guilty plea.”101  However, in addition to jurisdictional 
challenges, a defendant who pleads guilty does not waive the right to attack 
the validity of the guilty plea itself, including challenges to the knowing and 
voluntary nature of the plea and claims of ineffective assistance of 
counsel.102 
 
 90. See id. 
 91. See id. 
 92. See id. at 748. 
 93. See id. at 756–57. 
 94. FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(d)–(e). 
 95. FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(d)(1). 
 96. FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(d)(2)(B). 
 97. FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(e); see also 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (2006). 
 98. See Stephanos Bibas, Regulating the Plea-Bargaining Market:  From Caveat Emptor 
to Consumer Protection, 99 CALIF. L. REV. 1117, 1119 (2011). 
 99. See Douglass, supra note 37, at 465. 
 100. 411 U.S. 258 (1973). 
 101. Id. at 267. 
 102. See Douglass, supra note 37, at 516–17; see also Daniel P. Blank, Plea Bargain 
Waivers Reconsidered:  A Legal Pragmatist’s Guide to Loss, Abandonment and Alienation, 
68 FORDHAM L. REV. 2011, 2025–26 (2000). 
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2.  The Current Role of Plea Bargaining 
In 1990, 84 percent of all federal criminal cases prosecuted to conclusion 
were resolved by guilty plea.103  By 2011, that number had risen to 97 
percent.104  One reason for this increase may be the specter of mandatory 
minimum sentences.105  In the past, judges in federal court had the power to 
determine criminal sentences.106  This meant that a prosecutor knew that 
she could not hold an excessive sentence over a defendant’s head at the plea 
bargaining stage as motivation to avoid trial, because the ultimate power to 
sentence rested with the judge.107  The discretion afforded to judges has 
dwindled, however, with the advent of the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines.108  
Now, judges are constrained by mandatory minimum sentences, and 
prosecutors have more power at the plea bargaining stage.109  A prosecutor 
often has the ability to charge a defendant with a variety of crimes carrying 
longer or shorter sentences; a defendant may therefore be heavily motivated 
to accept a prosecutor’s offer to plead guilty to a crime that does not carry a 
mandatory minimum, especially if the alternative charge carries a lengthy 
sentence.110  In the era of mandatory minimum sentencing, the prosecutor’s 
control over the charge amounts to control over a defendant’s sentence.111 
A second cause for the increase in guilty pleas may be the practice of 
overcharging.112  To convince a defendant to plead guilty, a prosecutor 
might threaten to charge him with an offense carrying a harsher sentence 
should he decide to go to trial.113  For example, in Bordenkircher v. 
Hayes,114 the prosecutor told the defendant that if he did not plead guilty to 
the offense charged, which was punishable by two to ten years in prison, 
she would seek a new indictment under a state law that carried a mandatory 
life sentence.115  Hayes pled not guilty and subsequently received a life 
sentence.116  The Supreme Court held that the decision of what crime to 
charge was within the discretion of the prosecutor and that charging the 
defendant with a more severe crime did not constitute a violation of due 
process.117  By sanctioning the practice of overcharging, the Court allowed 
 
 103. Gary Fields & John R. Emshwiller, Federal Guilty Pleas Soar As Bargains Trump 
Trials, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 23, 2012, 10:30 PM), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB100008723
96390443589304577637610097206808.html. 
 104. Id. 
 105. See SALTZBURG, supra note 57, at 1049. 
 106. Jeffrey Standen, Plea Bargaining in the Shadow of the Guidelines, 81 CALIF. L. REV. 
1471, 1475 (1993). 
 107. See id. 
 108. Id. 
 109. See id. 
 110. See id. 
 111. Id. 
 112. See SALTZBURG, supra note 57, at 1051. 
 113. See id. 
 114. 434 U.S. 357 (1978). 
 115. Id. at 358. 
 116. Id. at 359. 
 117. Id. at 364–65. 
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prosecutors to use harsher sentences as leverage to obtain guilty pleas.118  
This technique has now become a common practice,119 leading defendants 
to increasingly plead guilty, perhaps to avoid the risk of an extremely harsh 
sentence.120  As the percentage of criminal cases being resolved by guilty 
plea continues to increase,121 it becomes all the more necessary to establish 
proper procedures and safeguards to ensure that pleas are entered fairly and 
in a way that does not violate defendants’ constitutional rights.122 
C.  Why Require Pre-plea Disclosure of Exculpatory Brady Evidence? 
As discussed in Part II of this Note, the circuits are split as to whether the 
Brady rule applies to exculpatory evidence during plea bargaining.123  This 
section first discusses various policy arguments put forth by criminal 
defense attorneys and legal commentators in favor of pre-plea Brady 
disclosure, and then presents some arguments against expanding Brady. 
1.  Policy Justifications for Allowing Exculpatory 
Brady Challenges to Guilty Pleas 
Commentators have put forth a number of different justifications in 
pushing for the recognition of exculpatory Brady rights during plea 
bargaining.124  First, some argue from a constitutional standpoint that guilty 
pleas are not truly knowing and voluntary without the knowledge of 
material exculpatory evidence.125  These commentators argue that the 
decision to plead guilty rests substantially on the defendant’s assessment of 
the strength of the prosecution’s case, not on whether he actually committed 
the crime.126  A plea therefore cannot be knowing and voluntary if it is 
made without knowledge of material exculpatory evidence.127 
 
 118. Stephanos Bibas, Pleas’ Progress, 102 MICH. L. REV. 1024, 1039 (2004). 
 119. See Jeremy Root, Cruel and Unusual Punishment:  A Reconsideration of the Lackey 
Claim, 27 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 281, 293 (2002). 
 120. See Ana Maria Gutiérrez, The Sixth Amendment:  The Operation of Plea Bargaining 
in Contemporary Criminal Procedure, 87 DENV. U. L. REV. 695, 717 (2010). 
 121. See DEP’T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL 
JUSTICE STATISTICS ONLINE, tbl.5.22.2010, http://www.albany.edu/sourcebook/pdf/t5222010
.pdf (last visited Apr. 19, 2013). 
 122. See Gutiérrez, supra note 120, at 717–18; Nancy J. King, Regulating Settlement:  
What Is Left of the Rule of Law in the Criminal Process?, 56 DEPAUL L. REV. 389, 395–96 
(2007). 
 123. See infra Part II. 
 124. See Blank, supra note 102, at 2040.  While the complete breadth of justifications for 
pre-plea Brady challenges is too vast to be addressed here, some key arguments are 
presented. 
 125. See Kevin C. McMunigal, Disclosure and Accuracy in the Guilty Plea Process, 
40 HASTINGS L.J. 957, 964 (1989); see also Blank, supra note 102, at 2040. 
 126. Douglass, supra note 37, at 466. 
 127. See id. at 466–68.  The idea that Brady violations preclude knowing and voluntary 
pleas was highly influential in the Ninth Circuit’s decision to allow pre-plea Brady 
challenges. See infra Part II.A.5. 
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Other commentators have advocated for a plea bargaining disclosure 
requirement based on a contract analysis.  They argue that because a guilty 
plea agreement is essentially a contract, the doctrines of duress and mistake 
weigh in favor of pre-plea disclosure of exculpatory evidence.128  General 
appeals to fairness motivate the desire for Brady disclosure during plea 
bargaining as well:  if the true goal of the criminal process is justice, then a 
prosecutor’s suppression of exculpatory evidence to coerce a defendant to 
plead guilty directly contravenes that goal.129  Moreover, as Brady 
disclosures are required at trial, fairness dictates that the same requirements 
apply during plea bargaining.130 
Perhaps the most salient argument that commentators have raised in 
favor of requiring the pre-plea disclosure of material exculpatory evidence 
is the fear that, without such a requirement, innocent defendants are 
compelled to plead guilty.131  While some argue that innocent defendants 
will not plead guilty, the reality is that when faced with the alternative 
possibilities of a life sentence or a few years in prison, an innocent 
defendant might plead guilty to minimize that risk if he is unaware that the 
prosecution possesses exculpatory evidence.132  Moreover, prosecutors are 
more likely to suppress exculpatory evidence when they have a weak 
case—when the defendant is most likely to be innocent—because they 
would rather secure even a minimal conviction than lose the case 
altogether.133  Thus, the coercive effect of withholding exculpatory 
evidence is at its apex when the defendant is innocent.134 
Brady disclosure levels the playing field between the prosecutor and the 
defendant:  by forcing disclosure of exculpatory evidence, a prosecutor 
cannot bluff her way to a conviction by misrepresenting the strength of the 
government’s case.135  Bluffing, mandatory minimum sentencing, and the 
practice of overcharging all act to compel innocent defendants to plead 
guilty, as defendants seek to minimize the risk of a lengthy sentence.136  
Prosecutors, on the other hand, seek to maximize the number of convictions 
but are less concerned with the length of the sentence imposed.137  When 
disclosure is required, defendants are less susceptible to coercion, as they 
have accurate information about the strength of the prosecution’s case and 
 
 128. Blank, supra note 102, at 2041; see Eleanor J. Ostrow, Comment, The Case for 
Preplea Disclosure, 90 YALE L.J. 1581, 1609 (1981). See generally Robert E. Scott & 
William J. Stuntz, Plea Bargaining As Contract, 101 YALE L.J. 1909, 1926 (1992). 
 129. See Douglass, supra note 37, at 441–42. 
 130. See McMunigal, supra note 125, at 1010. 
 131. See id. at 963–64 (referring to the problem of innocent defendants pleading guilty as 
“accuracy” in pleading); see also Douglass, supra note 37, at 441. 
 132. See Douglass, supra note 37, at 448. 
 133. See Josh Bowers, Punishing the Innocent, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 1117, 1152 (2008). 
 134. See Douglass, supra note 37, at 449. 
 135. See Blank, supra note 102, at 2072. 
 136. See Douglass, supra note 37, at 448–49; see also McMunigal, supra note 125, at 
989. 
 137. Bowers, supra note 133, at 1128. 
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the relative risk of going to trial.138  One goal of the criminal justice system 
is to protect innocent people from being punished; by requiring pre-plea 
Brady disclosure, the risk of innocent defendants pleading guilty is 
substantially abated.139 
2.  Arguments Against Applying Brady During Plea Bargaining 
Scholarly argument against requiring disclosure of material exculpatory 
evidence prior to a guilty plea has been minimal.140  Some have argued that 
few innocent people are actually accused of crimes and that those who are 
will never actually plead guilty.141  Moreover, for guilty defendants, the 
disclosure of exculpatory evidence allows them to bargain for a lesser 
sentence than they actually deserve under the law.142  Others argue that 
while substantial information should be disclosed prior to a guilty plea, 
Brady’s narrow materiality standard provides too minimal a protection.143  
Additionally, there is a fear that if exculpatory evidence is required to be 
disclosed prosecutors will soon have to turn over their entire case to the 
defendant, thus negating the efficiency and expediency provided by plea 
bargaining.144  As is evident from the circuit court decisions holding that 
pre-plea Brady disclosure is not required, however, these policy arguments 
against disclosure give way to more substantial constitutional and 
precedential obstacles.145 
II.  BRADY CHALLENGES TO GUILTY PLEAS:  THE CIRCUIT SPLIT 
Part II of this Note discusses the circuit split regarding the use of the 
Brady rule to challenge a guilty plea for the failure to divulge exculpatory 
evidence.  The Supreme Court resolved one aspect of this split in Ruiz, 
where the Court held that a defendant could not raise a Brady violation 
where the prosecution failed to disclose impeachment evidence prior to the 
entry of a guilty plea.146  The Court did not, however, speak directly on the 
failure to divulge exculpatory evidence prior to a guilty plea.147  Every 
subsequent circuit court decision on the issue of exculpatory Brady 
challenges to guilty pleas has been substantially based on the court’s 
 
 138. McMunigal, supra note 125, at 968–73. 
 139. See id. at 965–67. 
 140. See Douglass, supra note 37, at 442. 
 141. See McMunigal, supra note 125, at 964. 
 142. See Douglass, supra note 37, at 489. 
 143. See id. at 442.  However, Douglass notes that “even a limited rule of disclosure may 
be better than none.” Id. at 443. 
 144. See Tom Stacy, The Search for the Truth in Constitutional Criminal Procedure, 
91 COLUM. L. REV. 1369, 1394 (1991); see also United States v. Ruiz, 536 U.S. 622, 632 
(2002). 
 145. See infra Part II. 
 146. See id. at 625. 
 147. See id. 
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interpretation of Ruiz’s holding.148  However, these interpretations have 
differed greatly, creating a new circuit split.  To resolve this split, the 
meaning of Ruiz must be understood not only in the context of the Brady 
rule, but in the larger picture of what rights are afforded to a criminal 
defendant at different stages of the judicial process. 
A.  The Pre-Ruiz Split 
Before Ruiz, the Second, Sixth, Eighth, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits held 
that a defendant may raise a Brady challenge to a guilty plea.  However, the 
reasoning supporting these decisions varied:  some courts have found that 
Brady violations render guilty pleas unknowing and involuntary,149 while 
others found that suppression of Brady material constitutes an exception to 
the “knowing and voluntary” rule for the validity of a guilty plea.150  
Conversely, the Fifth Circuit held that a guilty plea precludes a Brady 
challenge, and the Eighth Circuit later went against its earlier decision and 
held the same.151  While the Supreme Court answered some questions 
raised by this split in Ruiz, others remain unanswered:  Ruiz addressed only 
the question of impeachment Brady material, which until then had been 
viewed as equivalent to exculpatory material for purposes of Brady 
challenges.152  This section chronologically details the circuit split before 
Ruiz, and the principles underlying the different circuit’s positions on Brady 
challenges to guilty pleas. 
1.  The Sixth Circuit Allows a Post-plea Brady Challenge 
In Campbell v. Marshall, the Sixth Circuit became the first court to 
decide whether a defendant may raise a Brady challenge to a guilty plea.153  
The Sixth Circuit held that a Brady violation could potentially negate the 
voluntary and knowing character of a guilty plea.154  However, the court 
found that a Brady violation was just one part of the analysis of a guilty 
plea’s validity and was not always sufficient on its own to preclude a plea’s 
knowing and voluntary nature.155  In addition to suppression of Brady 
material, the court also looked at the factual basis for the plea, the 
 
 148. See, e.g., United States v. Conroy, 567 F.3d 174, 179 (5th Cir. 2009); McCann v. 
Mangialardi, 337 F.3d 782, 787 (7th Cir. 2003). 
 149. See, e.g., United States v. Wright, 43 F.3d 491, 496 (10th Cir. 1994). 
 150. See, e.g., Miller v. Angliker, 848 F.2d 1312, 1320–21 (2d Cir. 1988). 
 151. See infra Part II.A.2, A.5.  The Eighth Circuit contradicted itself, first allowing post-
plea Brady challenges and then holding the opposite shortly after. 
 152. See Alexandra Natapoff, Deregulating Guilt:  The Information Culture of the 
Criminal System, 30 CARDOZO L. REV. 965, 981 (2008).  Before Ruiz, the circuit courts’ 
disposition of Brady questions during plea bargaining did not depend on whether the 
evidence in question went to impeachment of witnesses or the defendant’s factual innocence. 
See id. 
 153. 769 F.2d 314 (6th Cir. 1985). 
 154. See id. at 318–24; see also Corinna Barrett Lain, Accuracy Where It Matters:  Brady 
v. Maryland in the Plea Bargaining Context, 80 WASH. U. L.Q. 1, 10 (2002). 
 155. Campbell, 769 F.2d at 321–24.  The court ruled that the pre-plea suppression of 
Brady material was not a per se constitutional violation. See id. at 322. 
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procedures used by the court in accepting the plea, and the effectiveness of 
Campbell’s attorney.156 
Under this totality-of-the-circumstances approach, the Sixth Circuit 
ultimately held that the prosecutor’s improprieties did not invalidate the 
defendant’s guilty plea.157  Still, the Sixth Circuit reached the merits of the 
post-plea Brady claim, and suggested that under other circumstances, the 
failure to divulge material exculpatory evidence could render a guilty plea 
invalid.158  Under this approach, even if the court were to find that the 
Supreme Court’s guilty plea jurisprudence precluded post-plea Brady 
claims by name, the suppression of material exculpatory evidence could 
still be a factor that renders a plea unknowing and involuntary. 
2.  Contradiction in the Eighth Circuit 
In two opinions separated by only one year, the Eighth Circuit first 
decided a defendant’s Brady challenge to his guilty plea on the merits, then 
later held that a guilty plea waived the defendant’s right to assert a Brady 
claim.159 
a.  White v. United States 
In the first Eighth Circuit case to address this issue, White v. United 
States,160 the court expressly adopted the Sixth Circuit’s framework from 
Campbell, holding that a defendant in a federal habeas corpus proceeding 
could attack the knowing and voluntary nature of his guilty plea based on 
the suppression of material evidence.161  The court quoted Campbell for the 
proposition that “the Supreme Court did not intend to insulate all 
misconduct of constitutional proportions from judicial scrutiny solely 
because that misconduct was followed by a plea which otherwise passes 
constitutional muster as knowing and intelligent.”162  The court therefore 
permitted collateral attacks on guilty pleas based on the failure to disclose 
exculpatory Brady evidence.163 
 
 156. See id. at 321–22. 
 157. See id. at 324; see also Lain, supra note 154, at 10. 
 158. See Campbell, 769 F.2d at 324; see also Douglass, supra note 37, at 517. 
 159. See id. at 6. 
 160. 858 F.2d 416 (8th Cir. 1988).  The Brady material in this case was impeachment 
evidence, rather than exculpatory, as it went to the credibility of the key witness against the 
defendant. See id. at 423.  Though White’s claim could not have been heard after Ruiz, see 
infra note 241 and accompanying text, the Eighth Circuit’s reasoning was nearly identical to 
the Sixth Circuit’s reasoning in Campbell, which concerned exculpatory Brady material. See 
infra Part II.A.1. 
 161. See White, 858 F.2d at 421–22. 
 162. Id. at 422. 
 163. See id.; see also Erica G. Franklin, Note, Waiving Prosecutorial Disclosure in the 
Guilty Plea Process:  A Debate on the Merits of “Discovery” Waivers, 51 STAN. L. REV. 
567, 573 n.43 (1999). 
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Following the Sixth Circuit’s lead, the Eighth Circuit analyzed the 
validity of White’s plea under a totality-of-the-circumstances approach.164  
Like the Sixth Circuit in Campbell, the court sought to determine whether 
White’s knowledge of the withheld information would have “affected his 
decision to forego trial.”165  The Eighth Circuit found that the undisclosed 
Brady material would not have been controlling in White’s decision 
whether to plead guilty or proceed to trial.166  Additionally, the court held 
that the benefit conferred to White by pleading guilty weighed in favor of 
the finding that he would have pled guilty even with the suppressed 
evidence.167  As White had previously stated at his plea hearing that it was 
in his “best interest to terminate all of the litigation as quickly as possible,” 
the court found it unlikely that knowledge of the suppressed material would 
have changed his decision.168  Despite the ruling against White, this case 
appeared to establish in the Eighth Circuit a defendant’s ability to raise a 
Brady claim to challenge a guilty plea for nondisclosure of exculpatory 
evidence.169 
b.  Smith v. United States 
The Eighth Circuit quickly changed course in Smith v. United States, 
decided less than one year after White.170  In a very brief opinion, the court 
declined to reach the merits of Smith’s claim, holding that by pleading 
guilty Smith had waived all challenges “except those related to 
jurisdiction.”171  The court made no mention of its previous precedent in 
White or of the Brady rule.172  By declining to reach the merits of Smith’s 
Brady challenge to his guilty plea, the Eighth Circuit split from the Sixth 
(and from its previous holding in White). 
3.  The Second Circuit’s Approach:  Suppression of Material Evidence 
As Official Misconduct 
In Miller v. Angliker, the Second Circuit joined the Sixth in allowing a 
defendant to challenge the validity of a guilty plea for the failure of the 
prosecution to disclose material exculpatory evidence, but on a different 
legal theory.173  The court found that a guilty plea is valid if it is both 
 
 164. White, 858 F.2d at 422. 
 165. Id. at 424. 
 166. Id. 
 167. See id. 
 168. Id. 
 169. See Lain, supra note 154, at 6 n.23. 
 170. 876 F.2d 655 (8th Cir. 1989). 
 171. Id. at 657. 
 172. See id. 
 173. 848 F.2d 1312 (2d Cir. 1988).  This case actually involved a plea of not guilty by 
reason of insanity. Id. at 1319.  However, the Second Circuit decided that in determining 
whether Miller could raise a Brady challenge, it would treat his plea of not guilty by reason 
of insanity like a guilty plea. Id.  The court reasoned that both pleas waived certain rights 
normally held by the defendant at trial, including the right to argue that he did not commit 
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intelligent and voluntary.174  However, the court found that this test only 
applies so long as there is no “misrepresentation or other impermissible 
conduct by state agents.”175  The court proceeded to note that a defendant’s 
decision whether or not to plead guilty rested heavily on a determination of 
the strength of the prosecution’s case against him, and the availability of 
exculpatory evidence.176  The Second Circuit concluded that “even a guilty 
plea that was ‘knowing’ and ‘intelligent’ may be vulnerable to challenge if 
it was entered without knowledge of material evidence withheld by the 
prosecution.”177  Applying the materiality standard from Bagley and 
Strickland, the court found that there was a reasonable probability that, but 
for the suppression of the file, Miller would not have taken the plea 
agreement, and would instead have gone to trial.178  Based on that 
probability, the suppression of the file violated Miller’s due process rights 
under Brady.179 
Under the Second Circuit’s analysis, the prosecution’s suppression of 
material Brady evidence, while not causing the plea to be unintelligent or 
involuntary, nevertheless renders it constitutionally invalid due to 
“misrepresentation or other impermissible conduct by state agents.”180  This 
holding stands in contrast to the Sixth Circuit’s approach in Campbell.181  
Both courts reached the merits of the defendants’ Brady claims, but the 
Second Circuit viewed Brady violations as an exception to the rule that a 
guilty plea must be knowing and voluntary, whereas the Sixth Circuit 
viewed Brady violations as having the potential to preclude a knowing and 
voluntary plea.182  While this rule has been consistently applied in the 
Second Circuit,183 other circuits have identified a different basis for 
permitting Brady challenges to guilty pleas in similar situations. 
 
the alleged acts, the right to challenge the validity of his confession, and the right to 
introduce any other evidence to cast doubt on his commission of the alleged acts. Id. 
 174. See id. at 1320 (citing Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742 (1970); Boykin v. 
Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 (1969)). 
 175. Id. (quoting Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742 (1970)). 
 176. See id. 
 177. Id. 
 178. See id. at 1322–24.  The Second Circuit noted that the standard for materiality 
applied to Brady claims was the same as for claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. See 
id. at 1322.  The court held that, in order to show prejudice and invalidate his guilty plea, 
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on going to a full trial . . . .” Id. 
 179. Id. 
 180. Id. at 1320 (quoting Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 757 (1970)). 
 181. See supra Part II.A.1. 
 182. See Douglass, supra note 37, at 467 n.125. Compare Miller, 848 F.2d at 1320, with 
Campbell v. Marshall, 769 F.2d 314, 318–22 (6th Cir. 1985). 
 183. See, e.g., United States v. Avellino, 136 F.3d 249, 255 (2d Cir. 1998); Tate v. Wood, 
963 F.2d 20, 25 (2d Cir. 1992). 
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4.  The Tenth Circuit’s Approach:  Suppression of Brady Material 
May Preclude a Knowing and Voluntary Guilty Plea 
While the Tenth Circuit joined the Second and Sixth Circuits in allowing 
a defendant to raise a Brady challenge to a guilty plea, it supported its 
holding with different reasoning.  The court first addressed the question in 
United States v. Wright,184 where the Tenth Circuit stated that a defendant 
who enters a knowing and voluntary guilty plea “waives all non-
jurisdictional challenges to his conviction.”185  This language closely 
mirrors the Eighth Circuit’s language in Smith, which held that a guilty plea 
precluded Brady challenges.186  However, rather than foreclosing upon 
Wright’s ability to raise a Brady challenge, the Tenth Circuit held that 
Wright could challenge his conviction by asserting that he did not enter his 
plea intelligently or voluntarily due to the claimed Brady violation.187  The 
court noted that a defendant who pleads guilty may still challenge that plea 
as being the “product of prosecutorial threats, misrepresentations, or 
improper promises,” which go directly to the knowing and voluntary nature 
of the plea.188  According to the Tenth Circuit, failure to divulge Brady 
material is a form of “misrepresentation” with the potential to render a 
“guilty plea a constitutionally inadequate basis for imprisonment.”189 
Whereas the Second Circuit in Miller found that official misconduct—the 
government’s failure to turn over Brady evidence—was an exception to the 
“voluntary and intelligent” test for the validity of a guilty plea, the Tenth 
Circuit reasoned that such misconduct can undercut the intelligent or 
voluntary nature of the plea.190  In essence, the court found that a defendant 
may be incapable of entering a truly voluntary guilty plea if he is unaware 
of material evidence in his favor that weakens the prosecution’s case 
against him.191  The court also reasoned that allowing Brady challenges to 
guilty pleas was justified by “the importance to the integrity of our criminal 
justice system that guilty pleas be knowing and intelligent.”192 
In discussing materiality, the Tenth Circuit held that Brady evidence was 
material “only if there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence 
been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been 
different.”193  A “reasonable probability” was a probability “sufficient to 
undermine confidence in the outcome.”194  The court ultimately held that 
 
 184. 43 F.3d 491 (10th Cir. 1994). 
 185. Id. at 494. 
 186. See supra note 171 and accompanying text. 
 187. See Wright, 43 F.3d at 494. 
 188. Id. at 495 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 189. Id. at 497 (quoting Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 75 (1977)).  Notably, the 
Tenth Circuit found that a Brady violation can render a guilty plea unknowing and 
involuntary only “under certain limited circumstances.” Id. at 496. 
 190. See id. at 495; see also Miller v. Angliker, 848 F.2d 1312, 1320 (2d Cir. 1988). 
 191. See Wright, 43 F.3d at 496; see also Lain, supra note 154, at 12. 
 192. Wright, 43 F.3d at 496. 
 193. Id. (quoting United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682 (1985)). 
 194. Id. (quoting United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682 (1985)). 
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Wright’s plea was valid, finding that the prosecution’s failure to disclose 
immunity agreements offered to witnesses was not material to guilt or 
punishment.195  While the court did not find in Wright’s favor, the decision 
solidified the Tenth Circuit’s rule allowing a defendant to challenge a guilty 
plea based on a Brady violation.196 
5.  The Ninth Circuit’s Per Se Rule 
In Sanchez v. United States, the Ninth Circuit adopted an even more 
expansive view of a defendant’s Brady rights during plea bargaining.197  
The Ninth Circuit began by discussing whether a defendant may raise a 
Brady claim to vacate a guilty plea, noting that the Second, Sixth, and 
Eighth Circuits had already answered in the affirmative.198  The Ninth 
Circuit likewise allowed post-plea Brady challenges, finding that a guilty 
plea cannot be knowing and voluntary if made without knowledge of 
material evidence suppressed by the prosecution.199  However, rather than 
following the Sixth Circuit’s method of considering the totality of the 
circumstances in determining whether a guilty plea was valid, the Ninth 
Circuit held that a Brady violation automatically renders a plea unknowing 
and involuntary.200  The court found that such a rule makes sense because 
“‘a defendant’s decision whether or not to plead guilty is often heavily 
influenced by his appraisal of the prosecution’s case.’”201 
The court also noted that prohibiting defendants from asserting Brady 
claims to challenge guilty pleas would tempt prosecutors to “deliberately 
withhold exculpatory information as part of an attempt to elicit guilty 
pleas.”202  While the court appeared to believe it was following the other 
circuits, it failed to note that the Second Circuit had not found that a Brady 
violation prevented a plea from being knowing and voluntary, but had 
instead found that a Brady violation constitutes official misconduct that 
negates an otherwise knowing and voluntary plea.203 
 
 195. See id. at 497. 
 196. See id. 
 197. 50 F.3d 1448 (9th Cir. 1995). 
 198. See id. at 1453. 
 199. See id. 
 200. See id. (“A waiver cannot be deemed intelligent and voluntary if entered without 
knowledge of material information withheld by the prosecution.” (internal quotation marks 
omitted)); see also Lain, supra note 154, at 8. 
 201. Sanchez, 50 F.3d at 1453 (quoting Miller v. Angliker, 848 F.2d 1312, 1320 (2d Cir. 
1988)). 
 202. Id. 
 203. Compare id. (“Three circuits have held that a defendant can argue that his guilty plea 
was not voluntary and intelligent because it was made in the absence of withheld Brady 
material.”), with Miller v. Angliker, 848 F.2d 1312, 1320 (2d Cir. 1988) (“[W]e conclude 
that even a guilty plea that was ‘knowing’ and ‘intelligent’ may be vulnerable to challenge if 
it was entered without knowledge of material evidence withheld by the prosecution.”).  The 
court also adopted the same standard of materiality as the Second Circuit in Miller, finding 
that Brady evidence is material only when there is a reasonable probability that the defendant 
would not have pleaded guilty had he received the undisclosed information. See Sanchez, 
50 F.3d at 1453. 
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While the Ninth Circuit did not ultimately find that the government’s 
nondisclosure of evidence violated Brady, the test established by this court 
was the most defendant-friendly to date.204  Whereas the Sixth Circuit 
viewed Brady violations as having the potential to invalidate a guilty plea 
under a totality-of-the-circumstances approach,205 the Ninth Circuit 
effectively adopted a “per se” rule whereby a Brady violation automatically 
precludes a knowing and voluntary plea.206 
6.  The Fifth Circuit Dissents 
In Matthew v. Johnson,207 the Fifth Circuit was the first circuit court to 
lay down a full, detailed opinion holding that a defendant could not 
challenge the validity of a guilty plea due to a Brady violation.  In 
considering whether or not to proceed to the merits of Matthew’s Brady 
claim, the Fifth Circuit first noted that the Second, Sixth, Eighth, Ninth, and 
Tenth Circuits had generally held that a defendant could assert a Brady 
violation to challenge his guilty plea.208  The court, however, also cited 
Smith and two district court cases holding that Brady violations may not be 
asserted after a guilty plea.209 
The court proceeded to find that the government’s duty under Brady to 
disclose material exculpatory evidence is based on the Due Process Clause 
and “exists to ensure that the accused receives a fair trial.”210  The court 
continued to emphasize the language in Brady that discussed the impact of 
withholding evidence on the trial itself, and found that the inclusion of 
impeachment evidence in the Brady rule by Giglio was also justified by the 
potential detriment to the jury’s determination of guilt.211  Thus the court 
framed the Brady rule not as one that promoted fairness and protected 
defendants through the criminal justice process,212 but rather as a rule to 
ensure proper determinations of guilt at trial.213 
The Fifth Circuit also found that the Supreme Court’s materiality 
standard in Brady cases demonstrated that the rule was properly confined to 
the trial setting.214  The court found, citing Bagley, that a prosecutor was 
only required to disclose evidence that was favorable to the defense and, if 
suppressed, would deprive the defendant of a fair trial.215  This is a 
different reading of Bagley’s materiality standard than that of the Tenth 
 
 204. See John G. Douglass, Can Prosecutors Bluff?  Brady v. Maryland and Plea 
Bargaining, 57 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 581, 585 (2007). 
 205. Campbell v. Marshall, 769 F.2d 314, 324 (6th Cir. 1985). 
 206. See Sanchez, 50 F.3d at 1453; see also Blank, supra note 102, at 2039. 
 207. 201 F.3d 353 (5th Cir. 2000). 
 208. Id. at 358. 
 209. Id. 
 210. Id. at 360 (emphasis added). 
 211. See id. 
 212. See supra notes 129–30 and accompanying text. 
 213. See Matthew, 201 F.3d at 360–61. 
 214. See id. at 361. 
 215. Id. 
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Circuit and other courts that cite Bagley as holding that evidence is material 
if “there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to 
the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different.”216  
Nonetheless, the Fifth Circuit found Brady to be purely a trial right, and 
“where no trial is to occur, there may be no constitutional violation.”217  By 
pleading guilty or nolo contendere, the defendant waived not only his right 
to trial but also the right to assert constitutional violations of trial rights.218 
In prohibiting Matthew from raising a Brady challenge to invalidate his 
plea, the Fifth Circuit also distinguished the cases allowing such challenges 
in other circuits.219  Notably, the court found the Second Circuit’s 
holding—that a violation occurs if a defendant would have pled differently 
had he received the undisclosed information—to be unsupported by 
Supreme Court jurisprudence.220  The court found that such an argument 
was foreclosed by the Supreme Court’s decision in Brady v. United States, 
where the Court rejected the argument that because the defendant would not 
have pled guilty but for the possibility of receiving the death penalty at trial, 
his plea was invalid as an involuntary act.221  The Fifth Circuit found that 
while some circuits had held that a guilty plea was not knowing or 
voluntary if the defendant was not provided with material exculpatory 
evidence, the Supreme Court said otherwise.222  In McMann v. 
Richardson223 the Court recognized that the decision to plead guilty is 
inherently made without complete or accurate information, and in Brady v. 
United States224 the Court held that incorrect assessments of the strength of 
the government’s case did not preclude a knowing and voluntary plea.225  
Thus, the Fifth Circuit held that Brady was purely a trial right, and to 
extend it to plea bargaining would go against the Supreme Court’s 
established precedents.226 
B.  United States v. Ruiz 
Two years after Matthew, in United States v. Ruiz, the Supreme Court 
decided its first case directly on the question whether a Brady violation 
invalidates a guilty plea.227  Defendant Angela Ruiz was arrested in 
California for importing marijuana from Mexico into the United States.228  
Ruiz was offered a “fast track” plea deal, whereby she would waive 
 
 216. See United States v. Wright, 43 F.3d 491, 496 (10th Cir. 1994); see also Douglass, 
supra note 37, at 470–71. 
 217. Matthew, 201 F.3d at 361. 
 218. Id. at 362. 
 219. Id. at 362–63. 
 220. See id. at 363. 
 221. Id. at 366 (citing Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 750 (1970)). 
 222. Id. at 368. 
 223. 397 U.S. 759, 769 (1970). 
 224. 397 U.S. 742, 757 (1970). 
 225. See Matthew, 201 F.3d at 368. 
 226. See id. 
 227. United States v. Ruiz, 536 U.S. 622 (2002). 
 228. Id. at 625; see also United States v. Ruiz, 241 F.3d 1157, 1160 (9th Cir. 2001). 
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indictment, trial, and appeal in exchange for the government’s 
recommendation to the sentencing judge of a two-level reduction from the 
otherwise applicable U.S. Sentencing Guidelines sentence.229  The “fast 
track” deal specified that “any [known] information establishing the factual 
innocence of the defendant”230 has been disclosed to the defendant and 
required the defendant to “waiv[e] the right to receive impeachment 
information relating to any informants or other witnesses.”231  Ruiz 
declined the offer and was indicted for unlawful drug possession.232 
After the indictment, and in the absence of any subsequent plea 
agreement, Ruiz pled guilty.233  Ruiz asked the sentencing judge to grant 
her the same two-level reduction she would have received under the plea 
deal, but the government opposed the request and the district court imposed 
the standard Guideline sentence.234  Ruiz appealed her sentence to the Ninth 
Circuit, which vacated the district court’s sentence.235  The government 
sought certiorari, and the Supreme Court granted the petition.236 
Writing for the majority, Justice Breyer framed the question as whether 
federal prosecutors must disclose material impeachment evidence before 
entering into a plea agreement with a criminal defendant.237  Citing Brady, 
the Court located this right both in the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process 
Clause and the Sixth Amendment’s “fair trial” guarantee.238  The Court 
found that due to the gravity of waiving one’s constitutional trial rights by 
pleading guilty, the Constitution required that a guilty plea be entered 
knowingly and voluntarily, and with “sufficient awareness of the relevant 
circumstances and likely consequences.”239  The Court noted that the Ninth 
Circuit had essentially held that a guilty plea is not voluntary unless it is 
made with full knowledge of the material impeachment evidence possessed 
by the prosecution.240  The Supreme Court disagreed, holding that the 
Constitution does not require the disclosure of impeachment information 
before the entry of a guilty plea.241 
In support of this holding, the Court first found that impeachment 
information, while special in relation to the fairness of the trial, was not 
 
 229. Ruiz, 536 U.S. at 625.  In this case, that meant a reduction from an eighteen-to-
twenty-four month range to a twelve-to-eighteen month range. Id. 
 230. In other words, exculpatory Brady material. 
 231. Id. (alterations in original) (internal quotation marks omitted).  This clause refers to 
impeachment Brady material, included in the Brady rule by Giglio. See supra notes 36–40 
and accompanying text. 
 232. Ruiz, 536 U.S. at 625. 
 233. Id. at 625–26. 
 234. Id. at 626. 
 235. Id. 
 236. Id. 
 237. See id. at 625. 
 238. Id. at 628 (citing Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 748 (1970)). 
 239. Id. at 629 (quoting Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 748 (1970)). 
 240. Id. 
 241. See id. 
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significant to whether a guilty plea was knowing and voluntary.242  Noting 
that the Constitution does not confer a general right to criminal discovery, 
the Court found that a plea is ordinarily considered valid if the defendant 
“fully understands the nature of the right [he waives] and how it would 
likely apply in general in the circumstances—even though the defendant 
may not know the specific detailed consequences of invoking it.”243  The 
Constitution does not require that the government disclose all useful 
information to the defendant.244  The Court found that impeachment 
evidence was not “critical information of which the defendant must always 
be aware prior to pleading guilty,” due to the inconsistent way in which it 
tends to help a defendant.245 
Affirming the Fifth Circuit’s holding in Matthew,246 the Supreme Court 
held that the Constitution does not require that a defendant have complete 
knowledge of all relevant circumstances before entering a guilty plea.247  
The Court also found that the due process considerations underlying the 
Brady rule did not support a rule requiring the disclosure of impeachment 
material before pleading guilty.248  The added value of such a rule to the 
defendant would be limited, as impeachment information is rarely 
crucial.249  Moreover, the Court found little reason to believe that innocent 
individuals would plead guilty in the absence of impeachment evidence 
because the government was required to disclose “any information 
establishing the factual innocence of the defendant” under the “fast track” 
plea bargain, and the defendant was still protected by Rule 11.250  The 
Court appeared to assume that innocent defendants were very unlikely to 
plead guilty.251 
The Supreme Court also found that a constitutional rule requiring 
disclosure of impeachment information prior to a guilty plea could interfere 
with the “[g]overnment’s interest in securing those guilty pleas that are 
factually justified, desired by defendants, and help to secure the efficient 
administration of justice.”252  The Court agreed with the government’s 
warning that such a rule would disrupt investigations and potentially expose 
witnesses to harm.253  Such a requirement would also force the government 
 
 242. Id. 
 243. Id. (emphasis in original); see also Bibas, supra note 98, at 1133–34 (discussing the 
Supreme Court’s understanding of the voluntariness requirement in Ruiz). 
 244. Ruiz, 536 U.S. at 629. 
 245. Id. at 630. 
 246. See Matthew v. Johnson, 201 F.3d 353, 368 (5th Cir. 2000) (“The Court has 
explicitly recognized that the decision whether to plead guilty or go to trial is one made 
under circumstances of incomplete, and often inaccurate, information.”). 
 247. Ruiz, 536 U.S. at 633. 
 248. See id. at 631. 
 249. See id. at 630–32. 
 250. Id. at 631; see also FED. R. CRIM. P. 11. 
 251. Bibas, supra note 98, at 1133.  At oral argument, Justice Scalia went so far as to 
suggest that “our system never permits or encourages innocent defendants to plead guilty.” 
Id. at 1134 (quoting Transcript of Oral Argument at 12, Ruiz, 536 U.S. 622 (No. 01-595)). 
 252. Ruiz, 536 U.S. at 631. 
 253. Id. at 631–32. 
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to expend more time, energy, and manpower on preparation before plea 
bargaining, thereby erasing the benefits to judicial expediency which plea 
bargaining normally offers.254  In the alternative, the Court feared that the 
Ninth Circuit’s rule would result in more cases being sent to trial.255  In 
addition to not being in the best interests of the justice system, the Court 
held that such a change was not justified by the minimal benefit bestowed 
by requiring disclosure of impeachment evidence.256  The Court therefore 
held that the Constitution did not require the government to disclose 
impeachment evidence before the entry of a guilty plea.257 
C.  Judicial Interpretation of Ruiz:  The New Circuit Split 
While the Supreme Court was quite clear in striking down a rule 
requiring the pre-plea disclosure of impeachment evidence, it was not clear 
from the holding what Ruiz meant for exculpatory evidence.258  Prior to 
Ruiz, courts treated exculpatory and impeachment evidence as 
“constitutionally indistinguishable.”259  While some—including the 
Seventh and Tenth Circuits—have viewed Ruiz as suggesting that the Brady 
rule would apply to exculpatory evidence prior to the entry of a plea,260 
others—including the Second, Fourth, and Fifth Circuits—have understood 
Ruiz to imply a broader rule that the government has no duty to disclose any 
Brady material during plea negotiations.261  This section outlines the cases 
following Ruiz that address whether the prosecution must disclose material 
exculpatory evidence prior to the entry of a guilty plea. 
1.  Circuits That Find Ruiz Suggests That Failure To Disclose Material 
Exculpatory Evidence Violates Due Process 
The first two circuit courts to address this question after Ruiz both held 
that exculpatory evidence, unlike impeachment evidence, had to be 
disclosed prior to the entry of a guilty plea.  This section discusses these 
cases and their interpretation of Ruiz. 
 
 254. See id. at 632. 
 255. See id. 
 256. See id. 
 257. Id. at 633. 
 258. See Máximo Langer, Rethinking Plea Bargaining:  The Practice and Reform of 
Prosecutorial Adjudication in American Criminal Procedure, 33 AM. J. CRIM. L. 223, 273 
(2006). 
 259. Natapoff, supra note 152, at 981. 
 260. See, e.g., Langer, supra note 258, at 273 n.200 (collecting cases); Kevin C. 
McMunigal, Guilty Pleas, Brady Disclosure, and Wrongful Convictions, 57 CASE W. RES. L. 
REV. 651, 654 (2007) (“In response to the Supreme Court’s decision in Ruiz, the American 
College of Trial Lawyers proposed modifying Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11 to 
impose a duty to disclose exculpatory information in the guilty plea context.”). 
 261. See infra Part II.C.2. 
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a.  The Seventh Circuit 
The Seventh Circuit was the first to address the application of Brady to 
plea bargaining after Ruiz in McCann v. Mangialardi.262  In discussing 
McCann’s Brady claim, the court noted that the Supreme Court had not yet 
addressed whether disclosure of material exculpatory evidence was required 
outside the trial context.263  The court viewed Ruiz as drawing a major 
distinction between impeachment information—which was “special in 
relation to the fairness of the trial, not in respect to whether a plea is 
voluntary”264—and exculpatory evidence, which was at issue in 
McCann.265  Because of this distinction, the Seventh Circuit found that the 
question whether a guilty plea can be voluntary266 when it is made without 
knowledge of material exculpatory evidence was not directly answered by 
Ruiz.267 
The Seventh Circuit held that Ruiz “strongly suggests” that the 
government is required to disclose material exculpatory information prior to 
a guilty plea.268  The court found that the Supreme Court’s reasoning for 
not requiring disclosure of impeachment information was that such 
impeachment information was unlikely to be “critical information of which 
the defendant must always be aware prior to pleading guilty.”269  
Additionally, the disclosure of impeachment information was not required 
in Ruiz because the plea agreement already specified that the government 
would provide material exculpatory evidence.270  The Seventh Circuit held 
that this language created a distinction between impeachment and 
exculpatory evidence, and therefore indicated that the Supreme Court would 
find a due process violation if the government withheld material 
exculpatory evidence prior to the entry of a guilty plea.271 
Ultimately, however, the Seventh Circuit found that it did not have to 
actually resolve the issue, because McCann had not presented evidence to 
show that Mangialardi actually new about the cocaine being planted in his 
car.272  Still, the Seventh Circuit set the foundation for interpretation of Ruiz 
and pre-plea Brady requirements. 
 
 262. 337 F.3d 782 (7th Cir. 2003). 
 263. See id. at 787. 
 264. Id. (quoting United States v. Ruiz, 536 U.S. 622, 629 (2002)). 
 265. See id.  In McCann, the exculpatory evidence consisted of the defendant’s alleged 
knowledge that the cocaine found in the plaintiff’s car was planted there. Id. at 784. 
 266. Voluntary was defined by the Supreme Court in Ruiz and by the Seventh Circuit here 
as “knowing, intelligent, and sufficiently aware.” Ruiz, 536 U.S. at 629; McCann, 337 F.3d 
at 787 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 267. McCann, 337 F.3d at 787. 
 268. Id. 
 269. Id. (quoting Ruiz, 536 U.S. at 630) (emphasis omitted). 
 270. Id. 
 271. Id. at 788. 
 272. Id. 
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b.  The Tenth Circuit 
Ten years after its decision in United States v. Wright,273 the Tenth 
Circuit once again addressed the viability of post–guilty plea Brady 
challenges in United States v. Ohiri.274  While the district court had held 
that Ohiri could not establish a Brady violation prior to the entry of his 
guilty plea, the Tenth Circuit disagreed.275  The district court relied on Ruiz, 
which it viewed as holding that “the government is not required to produce 
all Brady material when a defendant pleads guilty.”276  The Tenth Circuit, 
however, found that Ruiz did not absolve the government of its disclosure 
responsibilities in this case.277 
The court first highlighted the Supreme Court’s statement that 
“‘impeachment evidence is special in relation to the fairness of a trial,’ not 
in respect to whether a plea is voluntary.”278  Like the Seventh Circuit in 
McCann,279 the Tenth Circuit used this passage to draw a distinction 
between impeachment and exculpatory evidence:  exculpatory evidence is 
“‘critical information of which the defendant must always be aware prior to 
pleading guilty,’”280 while impeachment evidence is not.281  Moreover, the 
Tenth Circuit found that the duty to disclose exculpatory evidence prior to a 
guilty plea was supported by the Supreme Court’s statement that Ruiz’s 
constitutional Brady rights were protected by the plea agreement’s 
stipulation that she would receive all material exculpatory evidence.282 
The Tenth Circuit also found that Ruiz was distinguishable from the case 
at bar in two ways.283  First, the withheld evidence in this case was 
exculpatory, whereas the evidence in Ruiz was impeachment evidence.284  
Second, the court found a significant difference between the “fast track” 
plea in Ruiz, which was offered before an indictment, and the plea 
agreement offered to Ohiri on the same day as jury selection.285  The Tenth 
Circuit understood the Supreme Court’s holding in Ruiz as being relatively 
narrow:  that there was no due process violation in requiring a defendant to 
waive the disclosure of impeachment evidence before indictment.286  This 
did not, however, imply that the government could withhold material 
exculpatory evidence if the defendant accepts a last-minute plea deal.287  
 
 273. 43 F.3d 491 (10th Cir. 1994). 
 274. 133 F. App’x 555 (10th Cir. 2005). 
 275. See id. at 562. 
 276. Id. at 561. 
 277. Id. at 562. 
 278. Id. (quoting United States v. Ruiz, 536 U.S. 622, 629 (2002)). 
 279. See supra notes 264–65 and accompanying text. 
 280. Ohiri, 133 F. App’x at 562 (quoting United States v. Ruiz, 536 U.S. 622, 630 
(2002)). 
 281. See id. 
 282. Id. (citing United States v. Ruiz, 536 U.S. 622, 631 (2002)). 
 283. See id. 
 284. Id. 
 285. Id. 
 286. See id. 
 287. See id. 
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The Tenth Circuit cited McCann as holding the same, and also as 
understanding Ruiz to suggest that exculpatory evidence must be disclosed 
prior to a guilty plea.288  The court therefore held that post–guilty plea 
Brady challenges for suppression of exculpatory evidence were permitted 
after Ruiz.289 
2.  Circuits That Find Ruiz Precludes All Brady Challenges to Guilty Pleas 
In United States v. Conroy, the Fifth Circuit once again disagreed with 
the other circuits, mirroring the split that existed before Ruiz.290  One year 
later in United States v. Moussaoui,291 the Fourth Circuit indicated that it 
might follow suit, but its holding was not an outright endorsement of 
Conroy.  The Second Circuit also suggested in dictum, in Friedman v. 
Rehal,292 that it might reverse course from Miller and its progeny.  This 
section discusses these three cases and the circuit split as it currently exists. 
a.  The Fifth Circuit 
Nine years after its decision in Matthew v. Johnson,293 the Fifth Circuit 
once again held that a guilty plea precludes a Brady challenge in Conroy.294  
The court declined to reach the merits of Conroy’s Brady claim, finding that 
it was precluded by Ruiz and Matthew.295  First, the court reviewed its 
holding in Matthew, where it found that the Brady rule was only intended to 
ensure that the defendant received a fair trial, and that it did not apply when 
an individual waived his trial rights.296  In addition, the court cited a 
number of Fifth Circuit decisions following Matthew that also found that a 
guilty plea waives the right to claim a Brady violation.297 
In further support of its holding, the Fifth Circuit found that the Supreme 
Court in Ruiz had declined to extend Brady rights to guilty pleas.298  The 
Fifth Circuit did not see Ruiz as creating (or even implying) a distinction 
between impeachment and exculpatory evidence, but rather as precluding 
all post–guilty plea Brady claims.299  Accordingly, the Fifth Circuit held 
that Conroy’s Brady claim was precluded under Ruiz and Matthew, and that 
 
 288. See id.; see also McCann v. Mangialardi, 337 F.3d 782, 787 (7th Cir. 2003). 
 289. See Ohiri, 133 F. App’x at 561–62. 
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a defendant may not challenge a guilty plea for the suppression of 
impeachment or exculpatory evidence.300 
b.  The Fourth Circuit 
The Fourth Circuit’s first substantial discussion of post-plea Brady 
challenges after Ruiz occurred in Moussaoui.301  While the court ultimately 
found that it did not have to decide the Brady issue, a few points in dictum 
suggest that the Fourth Circuit would side with the Fifth in finding that Ruiz 
precluded all Brady challenges to guilty pleas.302  First, the court held that 
Brady was purely a trial right, existing to “preserve the fairness of a trial 
verdict.”303  The court found that when a defendant pleads guilty, the 
concerns of maintaining a fair trial and not convicting an innocent 
defendant are “almost completely eliminated because his guilt is 
admitted.”304 
The Fourth Circuit also acknowledged that Ruiz did not directly address 
the question of whether a defendant may challenge his guilty plea for 
suppression of exculpatory evidence.305  However, the court noted that the 
Supreme Court had recognized in Ruiz and previous cases that due process 
did not require the disclosure of all useful information prior to a guilty plea 
and that pleas may be valid despite inaccurate knowledge of the strength of 
the government’s case.306  Furthermore, the court cited with approval a 
previous Fourth Circuit case decided shortly after Ruiz, holding that “the 
prosecutor’s failure to disclose information potentially relevant as 
mitigation evidence” prior to the entry of a guilty plea, did not invalidate 
the plea.307  Thus, the Fourth Circuit’s decision appears to be in line with 
the Fifth Circuit’s holding in Conroy, finding that Ruiz confined Brady to 
the trial setting.308 
c.  The Second Circuit 
The Second Circuit’s decision in Miller,309 allowing a post-plea Brady 
challenge for the suppression of exculpatory evidence, was followed by a 
number of Second Circuit cases allowing both impeachment and 
 
 300. See id. 
 301. 591 F.3d 263 (4th Cir. 2010). 
 302. See Wiseman, supra note 12, at 994. 
 303. Moussaoui, 591 F.3d at 285 (citing United States v. Ruiz, 536 U.S. 622, 628 (2002); 
Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963)). 
 304. Id. at 285. 
 305. Id. at 286. 
 306. Id. 
 307. Id. (citing Jones v. Cooper, 311 F.3d 306, 315 n.5 (4th Cir. 2002)); see also 
Wiseman, supra note 12, at 994. 
 308. See Cassidy, supra note 38, at 1444 n.67. 
 309. 848 F.2d 1312 (2d Cir. 1988). 
 3630 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 81 
exculpatory Brady challenges to guilty pleas.310  The Second Circuit had a 
chance to revisit this issue after Ruiz in Friedman, and although the court 
did not fully reverse its course,311 it suggested that it interpreted Ruiz as 
precluding all post-plea Brady challenges.312 
In Friedman, the Second Circuit viewed Ruiz as reaffirming the 
precedent from Brady that a defendant is entitled to information that is 
necessary to ensure a knowing and voluntary guilty plea.313  The court 
understood Ruiz to hold that because impeachment information is relevant 
only to the fairness of the trial, and not to the voluntariness of the plea, the 
failure to disclose such information prior to a guilty plea does not violate 
due process.314 
The Second Circuit found that the undisclosed evidence in this case was 
impeachment evidence and therefore not subject to disclosure requirements 
after Ruiz.315  However, the court noted that even if the suppressed evidence 
had been exculpatory, Friedman’s challenge would still be precluded by 
Ruiz.316  While the court found that Ruiz did not expressly overrule 
Miller,317 the Second Circuit held that, because the Supreme Court “has 
consistently treated exculpatory and impeachment evidence in the same 
way for the purpose of defining the obligation of a prosecutor to provide 
Brady material prior to trial,” the holding in Ruiz likely applied to both 
impeachment and exculpatory evidence.318  Furthermore, the court found 
that the reasoning underlying Ruiz supported such a ruling.319 
The circuit courts are thus split as to whether Ruiz permits post–guilty 
plea exculpatory Brady challenges.320  On one side, the Seventh and Tenth 
Circuits view Ruiz as creating a distinction between impeachment and 
exculpatory evidence, requiring the disclosure of the latter, but not the 
former, before a defendant enters a guilty plea.321  On the other side, the 
Fifth Circuit is cautiously joined by the Second and Fourth Circuits in 
understanding Ruiz to preclude all pre–guilty plea Brady claims.322  To 
resolve this split and fully define the disclosure rights of defendants during 
plea bargaining, the Supreme Court will have to address the specific 
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question whether the failure to disclose material exculpatory evidence prior 
to a guilty plea violates Brady. 
III.  AN ANALOGOUS CASE STUDY:  EXTENSION OF THE RIGHT 
TO EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL TO PLEA BARGAINING 
In addressing the question of whether Brady applies to the disclosure of 
exculpatory evidence during plea bargaining, a useful comparison may be 
drawn to the right to effective assistance of counsel.  The two rights are 
doctrinally linked.323  While Brady concerns whether the prosecutor’s 
actions violate a defendant’s due process rights,324 the right to effective 
assistance of counsel provides a minimum standard of representation for the 
defendant’s attorney.325  The Supreme Court has frequently noted that the 
same standard of materiality applies to reviews of both claims.326  
Additionally, like Brady, the right to effective assistance was traditionally 
considered purely a trial right, as it was rooted in the Sixth Amendment 
right to a fair trial.327  While numerous courts have held that Brady should 
not be extended to plea bargaining because it is a trial right,328 the Supreme 
Court recently recognized the right to effective assistance of counsel as 
applying during plea bargaining as well as trial.  In two companion cases 
decided in 2012, the Court held that a defendant may challenge a conviction 
where his attorney’s deficient assistance caused him to reject a plea 
agreement and receive a harsher sentence at trial.329  This part presents a 
case study of how and why the constitutional right to effective assistance of 
counsel—a right whose history and application share many similarities with 
Brady rights—was expanded into the plea bargaining arena. 
A.  The Right to Effective Assistance of Counsel 
The right to effective assistance of counsel is based in the Sixth 
Amendment, which states that “[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused 
shall enjoy the right to . . . have the Assistance of Counsel for his 
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defence.”330  While the Sixth Amendment provides only for the basic right 
to counsel, the idea that representation has to be more than nominal did not 
appear until 1932 in Powell v. Alabama.331  In Powell, the Supreme Court 
held that even though the trial court had attempted to designate counsel to 
the defendants, that attempt was either so half-hearted or so close to the 
start of the trial that it “amount[ed] to a denial of effective and substantial 
aid in that regard.”332  Powell thus set forth the idea that the right to counsel 
requires some threshold level of effectiveness.333  However, the Court did 
not define exactly what such representation actually entails.334 
The Supreme Court set the standard for overturning a conviction based 
on ineffective assistance of counsel over fifty years later in Strickland v. 
Washington.335  The Court held that the right to counsel is the right to 
effective assistance of counsel, and established a two-part test for 
determining when that right is violated.336  First, the defendant must show 
that his attorney’s performance fell below an objective standard of 
reasonableness.337  Second, the defendant must show that his attorney’s 
substandard assistance caused him prejudice.338  To demonstrate prejudice, 
the defendant must show that there is a reasonable probability that the 
outcome of the proceeding would have been different but for counsel’s 
errors.339  As noted in Bagley, this test for prejudice was based on the “test 
for materiality of exculpatory information not disclosed to the defense by 
the prosecution” in adjudicating Brady claims.340  Where representation is 
deficient and prejudice is shown, the Court held that a conviction must be 
overturned, as the attorney’s ineffective assistance “so undermined the 
proper functioning of the adversarial process that the trial cannot be relied 
on as having produced a just result.”341 
Although the holding was based primarily on the Sixth Amendment, the 
language used by the Court was not limited to the trial context.  
Washington’s challenge was not to his attorney’s actions at trial, but rather 
at the sentencing proceeding.342  The Court stated that the role of counsel 
was not only to promote a just trial, but to ensure the “ability of the 
adversarial system to produce just results.”343  Ultimately, the question that 
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the Strickland test sought to answer was whether “the conviction or . . . 
sentence resulted from a breakdown in the adversary process that renders 
the result unreliable.”344  This question left open the possibility that the 
right to effective assistance of counsel could be expanded to other stages of 
the judicial process. 
The Supreme Court first considered the use of the two-part Strickland 
test in the context of a guilty plea in Hill v. Lockhart, where defendant 
William Hill argued that his attorney’s incorrect legal advice rendered his 
guilty plea involuntary.345  The Supreme Court held that the Strickland test 
applies to ineffective assistance of counsel challenges to guilty pleas.346  
The Court’s holding was essentially a mixture of the tests set forth in 
Boykin and Strickland.347  First, the Court cited Boykin for the proposition 
that a guilty plea is only valid when it “represents a voluntary and 
intelligent choice among the alternative courses of action open to the 
defendant.”348  Where a defendant pleads guilty on the advice of counsel, 
he must to show that the advice of his attorney was not “within the range of 
competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases” in order to render his 
plea involuntary.349 
The Court held that this test for determining whether a plea was truly 
voluntary was not only compatible with the two-part test set forth in 
Strickland, but was supported by the same justifications.350  To ensure the 
proper administration of justice and prevent innocent defendants from being 
convicted, errors that affect the outcome of a judicial proceeding must have 
a remedy.351  To invalidate a guilty plea on the basis of ineffective 
assistance of counsel, a defendant must therefore show first that his 
attorney’s advice fell below an objectively reasonable standard, and second, 
that there is a reasonable probability that he would not have pled guilty 
absent the errors of his attorney.352  As Hill did not allege that he would 
have pled not guilty having received different advice, the Court found that 
he was not prejudiced by his attorney’s error.353 
B.  The Conflict:  Whether or Not To Fully Extend the Right to 
Effective Assistance of Counsel to Plea Bargaining 
Hill allowed a defendant to vacate a guilty plea where the ineffective 
assistance of counsel led him to accept a plea bargain and forgo trial, but it 
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did not address what recourse, if any, was available to a defendant whose 
attorney’s deficient performance caused him to reject a plea bargain and 
proceed to trial.354  Courts generally took one of three different approaches 
to this problem:  no remedy, specific performance of the plea bargain, or 
retrial.355 
The courts that provided no remedy for a defendant whose attorney’s 
deficient performance caused him to reject a plea agreement generally 
found that such a defendant suffered no prejudice.356  These courts held that 
prejudice occurs where some error deprives a defendant of some substantive 
or procedural right, but as there is no constitutional right to plea bargain,357 
there was no prejudice in rejecting a plea and standing trial.358  Courts 
found that this holding was further supported by the fact that the right to 
effective assistance of counsel was “grounded in the constitutional right to 
receive a fair trial.”359  This reason for denying post-plea ineffective 
assistance challenges to rejected guilty pleas mirrors the reason often put 
forth for denying post-plea Brady challenges:  both were considered by 
some courts to be purely trial rights.360  Finally, courts declining to allow 
ineffective assistance challenges where the defendant rejected a plea 
agreement found that it would be extremely difficult to determine the 
soundness of the attorney’s representation, whether the defendant actually 
would have pled differently, and whether the court would have accepted the 
plea.361 
Where courts found that the decision to reject a plea agreement did cause 
prejudice, that prejudice consisted of receiving a higher sentence at trial 
than he would have received under the guilty plea agreement.362  One 
remedy used by courts to cure this prejudice was the reinstatement of the 
original plea offer.363  For example, in United States v. Blaylock, the Ninth 
Circuit found prejudice where the defendant would have received a less 
severe sentence had he gone to trial.364  The court held that in determining 
the proper remedy, a court should “put the defendant back in the position he 
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would have been in if the Sixth Amendment violation had not occurred.”365  
The court found that in many cases a new trial would not cure the harm, and 
held that in such cases the original plea must be reoffered.366  However, not 
all courts proceeded identically in reinstating the original plea.  While some 
directed the government to reoffer the plea agreement and allow the 
defendant to decide whether or not to accept, others mandated that the 
defendant accept the original plea agreement and directed the trial court to 
sentence the defendant accordingly.367 
The second remedy offered by courts finding prejudice is the granting of 
a new trial.368  These courts also found prejudice where a defendant 
received a harsher sentence at trial than he would have if he had accepted 
the plea offer, and the decision to reject the offer was the result of deficient 
assistance of counsel.369  However, these courts held that reoffering the 
original plea agreement was not a proper remedy.  In Julian v. Bartley, the 
Seventh Circuit found that specific performance was inappropriate because 
the state was not responsible for the Sixth Amendment violation, and the 
defendant had never accepted the terms of the original offer.370  Instead, the 
judge ordered a new trial, and the court acknowledged that the state could 
choose to propose a plea agreement if it wished.371 
From these three approaches to cases where the ineffective assistance of 
counsel leads to the rejection of a plea agreement, two crucial questions 
remained:  First, does receiving a harsher sentence after a fair trial 
constitute prejudice to the defendant?  Second, if so, what is the proper 
remedy?  The Supreme Court answered these questions in Lafler v. 
Cooper372 and Missouri v. Frye.373 
C.  Resolution:  Lafler v. Cooper and Missouri v. Frye 
This section outlines and discusses two companion Supreme Court cases 
decided in 2012 that fully extended the right to effective assistance of 
counsel to defendants during plea bargaining. 
1.  Lafler v. Cooper 
The Supreme Court’s recent decisions in Lafler and Fry address the other 
side of the Hill coin:  situations where defense counsel’s errors caused a 
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defendant not to enter a guilty plea.374  In these two 5–4 decisions decided 
on the same day, the Court solidified the right to effective assistance of 
counsel during plea bargaining.375 
In Lafler, the question taken up by the Supreme Court was whether 
Cooper’s attorney’s incorrect legal statements regarding the prosecution’s 
ability to prove its case during plea bargaining, which led him to reject a 
favorable plea agreement and proceed to trial, deprived him of effective 
assistance of counsel.376  Although the petitioner and the Solicitor General 
argued that the Sixth Amendment protects only the defendant’s right to a 
fair trial, the Court disagreed.377  Rather, the defendant was entitled to the 
effective assistance of counsel at all “critical stages of a criminal 
proceeding.”378  The Court had already held in previous cases that plea 
negotiation was a critical stage.379  The guarantee of this constitutional right 
at all critical stages of a criminal proceeding is necessary to ensure the fair 
administration of the judicial process because defendants “cannot be 
presumed to make critical decisions without counsel’s advice.”380 
The Court, citing Hill, applied the Strickland test to Cooper’s claim.381  
This test is properly applied to plea bargaining because the question at the 
heart of the Strickland inquiry is whether the attorney’s errors “so 
undermined the proper functioning of the adversarial process that it failed to 
produce a reliably just result.”382  Thus the concern was with justice and 
fairness not solely at trial, but throughout the entire judicial process, 
including the plea bargaining stage that preceded it.383  The Court found 
that an otherwise fair trial does not remedy errors that occur during plea 
bargaining.384  Both sides agreed that the advice of Cooper’s counsel was 
deficient under the first Strickland prong; the problem was how to 
determine prejudice under the second prong.385 
The Court held that to show prejudice, Cooper had to show that the 
outcome of the plea process would have been different had he received 
sound legal advice.386  In Hill, that meant only that the defendant had to 
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show that he would not have pled guilty without the error of his attorney.387  
In this case, however, the Court held that Cooper must show three things:  
first, a reasonable probability that, but for the advice of his counsel, he 
would have entered a guilty plea; second, that the court would have 
accepted his terms; and third, that the conviction or sentence imposed 
would have been more favorable than what was actually decided.388  The 
Court held that Cooper was prejudiced by his attorney’s advice not to 
accept the plea offer, as he received a sentence more than three times as 
harsh as he would have had he pled guilty, and the case was remanded with 
an order that the state reoffer the plea agreement.389 
In further support of its holding that the Strickland test applied to the 
rejection of a guilty plea agreement, the Court noted that even though a 
defendant has no constitutional right to plea bargain, a defendant still 
retains his constitutional rights when the prosecution decides to engage in 
such negotiations:  “When [the government] opts to act in a field where its 
action has significant discretionary elements, it must nonetheless act in 
accord with the dictates of the Constitution.”390  The effective assistance of 
counsel is a constitutional right afforded to criminal defendants, and when a 
prosecutor decides to bring a defendant to the plea bargaining table—a 
critical stage of the judicial process—the defendant’s constitutional rights 
come with him.391 
Justice Scalia wrote the dissent, joined by Justice Thomas, and Chief 
Justice Roberts in all but part IV.392  Justice Scalia lamented what he 
viewed as the newly “constitutionalized” plea bargaining process, fearing 
that the Court would soon attempt to govern not only the behavior of 
defense attorneys but also the prosecution during plea bargaining.393  He 
found it problematic that Cooper’s alleged injury was having to stand 
trial.394 
Justice Scalia took no issue with the characterization of the entry of a 
guilty plea as a “critical stage” of the judicial process during which a 
defendant must be afforded the right to effective assistance of counsel.395  
However, he limited that characterization to the acceptance of a guilty plea; 
he would not require the effective assistance of counsel before a defendant 
rejects a plea bargain and proceeds to trial.396  Perhaps more importantly, 
Justice Scalia viewed the right to effective assistance of counsel as existing 
only to ensure a fair trial.397  Thus, there can be no Sixth Amendment 
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violation where the prejudice complained of is having to stand trial, even 
where the sentence is higher than would have been imposed under the plea 
agreement.398  According to Justice Scalia, Cooper was not deprived of a 
fair process by being forced to stand trial.399 
2.  Missouri v. Frye 
The Court addressed a similar, but not identical, question in Frye.400  
Whereas Lafler involved a defendant’s rejection of a favorable plea offer on 
the advice of counsel, Frye involved the defendant’s attorney’s failure to 
inform him of a plea offer, and the defendant’s acceptance of a subsequent 
offer on less favorable terms.401  The Supreme Court held that defense 
counsel has a duty to inform the defendant of potentially favorable plea 
offers made by the prosecution.402  By failing to do so in this case, Frye’s 
attorney deprived him of his constitutional right to effective assistance of 
counsel.403  The Court began its decision with a discussion of Hill and 
Padilla v. Kentucky.404  First, the Court reiterated the proposition from Hill 
that ineffective assistance of counsel claims for errors during plea 
bargaining are governed by the Strickland test.405  Second, the Court noted 
that plea bargaining is a “critical phase” of the judicial process, and that the 
constitutional protections of the Sixth Amendment apply even in that 
pretrial context.406  Moreover, the Court stated that a “knowing and 
voluntary” guilty plea does not supersede mistakes by a defendant’s 
attorney.407 
While the Court acknowledged the state’s argument that this presented a 
different situation from Hill and Padilla because those cases concerned a 
defendant who had accepted a guilty plea agreement, the Court did not find 
that difference sufficient to overcome the need for constitutional protection 
during plea bargaining.408  As in Lafler, the Court found that a defendant is 
entitled to effective assistance of counsel at all “critical stages” of a 
criminal proceeding.409  The Court understood “critical stages” to include 
the entry of a guilty plea.410 
The State urged that a defendant should not be allowed to vacate a guilty 
plea due to ineffective assistance of counsel for a number of reasons.411  
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Most importantly, the State argued that there is no constitutionally 
guaranteed right to accept a guilty plea offer, and that the plea bargaining 
process is so amorphous and lacking in clear standards or timelines that the 
prosecution would have little notice of problems or capacity to intervene.412  
While the Court found that these were tenable arguments, they were 
outweighed by the “simple reality” that 97 percent of federal convictions 
were obtained through guilty pleas.413  Due to the importance of plea 
bargaining to the judicial process, the Court reasoned that defense counsel 
had responsibilities that must be met in order to ensure the fair 
administration of justice.414  Moreover, the Court found that because the 
criminal justice system is now “for the most part a system of pleas, not a 
system of trials,” the guarantee of a fair trial was insufficient to cure pretrial 
errors.415  To deny defendants the effective assistance of counsel at plea 
bargaining would be to deny them effective representation “at the only 
stage when legal aid and advice would help him.”416  To provide the 
effective assistance guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment, the Court held 
that defense counsel had a duty to communicate formal guilty plea offers to 
the defendant.417  Frye’s attorney’s failure to do so therefore rendered his 
performance deficient.418 
As in Lafler, the Supreme Court applied the same standard of materiality 
for ineffective assistance of counsel claims as is used to review Brady 
claims:  the defendant must show a “reasonable probability [that he] would 
have accepted the earlier plea offer had [he] been afforded effective 
assistance of counsel.”419  In this case, Frye had to prove a reasonable 
probability that the end result of his criminal proceedings would have been 
more favorable, whether by a plea to a lesser charge against him or a less 
harsh sentence.420  As Frye’s attorney failed to communicate the plea offer, 
the Supreme Court remanded the case to apply the appropriate Strickland 
test and to determine if Frye was prejudiced by that failure.421 
Justice Scalia once again dissented, joined by Chief Justice Roberts and 
Justices Thomas and Alito.422  Although Justice Scalia found the cases to be 
substantially similar, he found that the justifications for his dissent in Lafler 
were even more present in Frye, where the fairness of the process and the 
conviction were established by the defendant’s admission of guilt.423 
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Justice Scalia found that, as there is no constitutional right to plea 
bargain, Frye was not deprived of any substantive or procedural right by his 
attorney’s failure to inform him of the plea offer.424  There was no question 
that this failure rendered the attorney’s performance deficient; however, as 
the deficiency did not deprive Frye of his “constitutional right to a fair 
trial,” there was no prejudice and no need for remedy.425  The dissent also 
took issue with the difficulty of defining what constitutes adequate 
representation during plea bargaining, finding it disconcerting that an 
attorney’s “personal style” might violate the Sixth Amendment.426 
Finally, the dissent disagreed with the Court’s analysis of potential 
prejudice to the defendant.427  Justice Scalia found it absurd to engage in 
“retrospective crystal-ball gazing” to determine whether the defendant 
would have accepted the earlier plea bargain, whether the prosecution 
would have withdrawn it, and whether the court would have accepted it.428  
He admitted that plea bargaining should be regulated, but found that the 
Sixth Amendment was not the proper means to do so.429 
3.  The Response to Lafler and Frye 
The Supreme Court’s decisions in Lafler and Frye were viewed by 
commentators as both logical and inevitable, the objections of Justice Scalia 
and the other dissenters notwithstanding.430  While the dissent took a 
formalist, historical approach to the question, the majority’s approach was 
more functional and contemporary, focusing on the fact that plea bargaining 
now dominates the criminal justice system.431  Having acknowledged the 
importance of plea bargaining as a critical stage in the judicial process, the 
Court would have been hard-pressed to deny constitutional protections to 
defendants at that stage.  The right to effective assistance of counsel could 
not be confined to the trial context; to hold otherwise would be to grant that 
right to only the 3 percent of federal defendants that actually go to trial.432  
Another important ruling from Lafler and Frye is that an otherwise fair trial 
does not cure the constitutional errors that came before.433  Indeed, 
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prejudice may be found where a heavier sentence is imposed than would 
have occurred had the defendant accepted the earlier plea.434 
Finally, while Justice Scalia found that the Court’s decisions constituted 
a radical departure from established jurisprudence,435 others viewed the 
decisions as simply applying the standards already established in 
Strickland.436  Strickland had a goal of promoting a just result, and this goal 
applies equally to convictions and sentences, even for guilty defendants.437  
In this sense, Lafler and Frye were relatively straightforward cases:  both 
defendants were prejudiced by receiving longer sentences due to 
unquestionably deficient assistance of counsel during plea bargaining, 
which is a critical stage of the judicial process.438  Under the Strickland 
standard, the Sixth Amendment required that their sentences be vacated and 
remanded.439 
IV.  RECOGNIZING THE RIGHT:  THE SUPREME COURT SHOULD PERMIT 
EXCULPATORY BRADY CHALLENGES TO GUILTY PLEAS 
The Supreme Court should resolve the circuit split that currently exists 
by allowing a criminal defendant to challenge a guilty plea for the failure to 
disclose exculpatory Brady material.  To settle this conflict, the Court 
should look not only to the prevailing logic among the circuit courts and its 
previous holding in Ruiz but also to its own recent decisions in Lafler and 
Frye that considered a question with very similar constitutional 
underpinnings in the context of plea bargaining.  Part IV.A of this Note 
shows that Ruiz allows exculpatory Brady challenges to guilty pleas.  Part 
IV.B argues that courts considering these challenges should follow the 
Ninth Circuit’s holding that a pre-plea Brady violation automatically 
precludes a knowing and voluntary guilty plea.  Part IV.C concludes by 
asserting that the same practical and jurisprudential reasoning that justified 
recognizing the pre-plea right to effective assistance of counsel also applies 
to Brady violations. 
A.  Ruiz Suggests That Material Exculpatory Evidence Must 
Be Disclosed Prior to a Guilty Plea 
Despite the Supreme Court’s focus on impeachment evidence in Ruiz, the 
holding suggests that a defendant may raise a post-plea Brady challenge for 
the failure to disclose material exculpatory evidence.440  First, contrary to 
the Second Circuit’s understanding in Friedman, the holding in Ruiz did not 
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apply equally to impeachment and exculpatory evidence.441  The Second 
Circuit properly found that, prior to Ruiz, the Supreme Court treated 
exculpatory and impeachment identically for purposes of Brady 
disclosure.442  However, the conclusion it drew from that fact was 
erroneous:  if the Court had wished to proscribe all post-plea Brady 
challenges, it could have easily done so by issuing its holding in general 
Brady terms.  Instead, the language used throughout the opinion, and 
specifically in the holding, was explicitly in terms of impeachment 
evidence:  “These considerations, taken together, lead us to conclude that 
the Constitution does not require the Government to disclose material 
impeachment evidence prior to entering a plea agreement with a criminal 
defendant.”443  Thus, at the very least it can be said that Ruiz declined to 
address post–guilty plea exculpatory Brady challenges; but it does not 
follow from the language of the opinion that Ruiz precludes all post-plea 
Brady claims. 
Rather than being neutral, the Supreme Court’s holding in Ruiz actually 
suggests that exculpatory Brady challenges are permitted for the very 
reasons that impeachment challenges are not.444  First, while courts 
proscribing Brady challenges to guilty pleas typically repeated the refrain 
that Brady was purely a “trial right,”445 the Supreme Court declined to do 
so.  Furthermore, the Seventh and Tenth Circuits were correct in 
understanding the Supreme Court in Ruiz to draw a significant distinction 
between impeachment and exculpatory evidence:  whereas impeachment 
evidence is only important in relation to the fairness of the trial, and 
therefore does not have to be disclosed before a guilty plea, exculpatory 
evidence may be determinative of the constitutional validity of a guilty 
plea.446  The Supreme Court found that impeachment evidence is unlikely 
to be “critical information of which the defendant must always be aware 
prior to pleading guilty.”447  What, then, would constitute such “critical 
information”?  As noted by the Seventh and Tenth Circuits, the answer 
implied by the Supreme Court is exculpatory evidence:  a defendant’s 
waiver of his constitutional rights through a guilty plea cannot be truly 
knowing and voluntary if he is unaware of evidence possessed by the 
prosecution that establishes his factual innocence.448 
Additional justification for understanding Ruiz as allowing exculpatory 
Brady challenges to guilty pleas is found in the Supreme Court’s discussion 
of the “fast track” plea agreement’s stipulations.  One of the key reasons 
behind the Court’s holding that the “fast track” agreement did not violate 
due process was the fact that the agreement explicitly required the 
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government to disclose material exculpatory evidence.449  The Court found 
that this disclosure of exculpatory evidence ensured that innocent 
defendants would not plead guilty, and held that the suppression of 
impeachment evidence does not violate due process so long as exculpatory 
evidence is divulged.450  By emphasizing the value of the exculpatory 
evidence disclosure requirement, the Supreme Court further underscored 
the distinction between impeachment and exculpatory evidence and 
indicated that the failure to disclose material exculpatory evidence violates 
a defendant’s due process rights.451 
B.  The Failure To Disclose Material Exculpatory Evidence Precludes 
a Knowing and Voluntary Guilty Plea 
Accepting that Ruiz allows Brady challenges for the failure to disclose 
material exculpatory evidence prior to a guilty plea, the question then 
becomes how to determine whether that failure renders a plea invalid.  
From the circuits that have allowed post–guilty plea Brady challenges, four 
methods of inquiry have emerged:  (1) the Second Circuit’s official 
misconduct approach, in which a Brady violation may invalidate an 
otherwise knowing and voluntary plea;452 (2) the Tenth Circuit’s 
misrepresentation approach, under which a Brady violation constitutes 
government misconduct that may preclude a knowing and voluntary guilty 
plea;453 (3) the Sixth and Eighth Circuits’ totality-of-the-circumstances 
approach, whereby a Brady violation is one of many factors that may negate 
the knowing and voluntary nature of a guilty plea;454 and (4) the Ninth 
Circuit’s per se approach, finding that a Brady violation automatically 
renders a guilty plea unknowing and involuntary.455  Of these four, the 
Ninth Circuit’s approach provides the most workable standard, and is the 
most closely aligned with the Supreme Court’s guilty plea jurisprudence. 
The Second Circuit’s misconduct approach misses the mark by choosing 
not to consider a Brady violation in relation to the knowing and voluntary 
nature of the plea.456  The court laudably noted that a defendant’s decision 
to plead guilty is highly dependent on his determination of the strength of 
the prosecution’s case and the existence of exculpatory information.457  
However, by phrasing its test in terms of government misconduct, the 
Second Circuit leaves open the question of what exactly constitutes official 
misconduct.  It is unclear whether misconduct occurs only when a 
prosecutor suppresses information specifically requested, or also where a 
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prosecutor fails to divulge evidence in the absence of a specific request.458  
Disclosure is required in both situations under Agurs.459  Additionally, this 
test fails to address the central question of a guilty plea’s validity—its 
knowing and voluntary nature.460  While the later Brady—Brady v. United 
States—did mention misconduct as a concern for the validity of guilty 
pleas,461 subsequent Supreme Court jurisprudence has been almost 
exclusively concerned with the knowing and voluntary standard.462 
The Tenth Circuit’s approach is similar to the Second Circuit’s in that it 
views Brady violations as official misconduct or misrepresentation.463  
However, this standard fits better with established guilty plea jurisprudence 
because it asks whether that official misconduct precludes a knowing and 
voluntary plea.464  Still, this approach falls short of a proper standard 
because it finds that a Brady violation renders a guilty plea unknowing and 
involuntary only under certain circumstances.465  A Brady violation is a 
violation of due process, and the Tenth Circuit recognized that Brady 
violations may occur during plea bargaining; it stands to reason that no plea 
which was entered through a violation of the defendant’s due process rights 
should retain its validity.466 
The totality-of-the-circumstances approach adopted by the Sixth and 
Eighth Circuits is attractive because it engenders careful consideration of 
whether a guilty plea was truly knowing and voluntary.467  Additionally, 
this approach would survive an interpretation of Ruiz that precludes all 
post-plea Brady challenges, because even if the suppression of material 
exculpatory evidence is not couched in terms of Brady, it is still one of the 
circumstances taken into account in determining the validity of the plea.468  
However, the totality-of-the-circumstances approach affords too little 
protection to defendants, as a Brady violation may still be insufficient to 
render a plea unknowing and involuntary.469  Like the Tenth Circuit’s 
approach, this approach does not comport with the Brady materiality 
standard.  Due process is violated where there is a reasonable probability 
that the result of the proceeding would have been different had the evidence 
been disclosed;470 under the totality-of-the-circumstances test, a court could 
find that a Brady violation occurred but still find that the guilty plea was 
knowing and voluntary because of additional factors surrounding the entry 
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of the plea.471  This gray area makes the totality-of-the-circumstances 
approach somewhat unworkable, and gives courts insufficient guidance on 
how to determine whether a plea was actually valid. 
The Ninth Circuit’s per se approach is the best application of the Brady 
rule to plea bargaining.472  Under this structure, if the court finds that the 
prosecution fails to disclose material exculpatory evidence prior to the entry 
of a guilty plea, the plea is automatically rendered unknowing and 
involuntary.473  The standard of materiality is imported from Bagley:  a 
Brady violation renders a plea invalid if there is a reasonable probability 
that the result of the plea negotiations would have been more favorable had 
the defendant received the undisclosed evidence.474  Unlike the Second 
Circuit’s approach, this standard addresses the central question of 
constitutionality for a guilty plea:  whether it was truly knowing and 
voluntary.475  Moreover, there is no gray area where Brady is violated but 
the plea is still considered knowing and voluntary.  Due process is violated 
where material exculpatory evidence is withheld, and any plea entered 
without knowledge of that evidence is not truly knowing and voluntary.476 
The Ninth Circuit’s approach is not without its problems.  The Supreme 
Court has held that a valid guilty plea does not require that a defendant have 
a perfect assessment of the strength of the prosecution’s case.477  However, 
the per se approach does not seek to provide a defendant with a complete 
understanding of the case against him.  Rather, it requires only that the 
prosecution turn over any exculpatory evidence that is material to the 
decision to plead guilty.478  The government therefore does not have to 
disclose immaterial evidence or impeachment evidence, so there is no fear 
that the prosecution will have to turn over its “entire file” to the 
defendant.479 
Moreover, while some additional judicial resources may be expended by 
defendants choosing to go to trial after learning of exculpatory evidence 
rather than pleading guilty,480 this expenditure is justified by both the 
criminal justice system’s interest in providing a fair and nonduplicitous plea 
bargaining system and the benefits this rule would confer upon 
defendants.481  Moreover, it would not require the government to expend 
resources digging for exculpatory evidence; it would only require the 
disclosure of evidence it already possessed.  Given the extremely high 
 
 471. See supra notes 153–56 and accompanying text. 
 472. See supra Part II.A.5. 
 473. See supra notes 200–01 and accompanying text. 
 474. See supra note 50 and accompanying text. 
 475. See supra notes 199–200 and accompanying text. 
 476. See supra notes 200–01, 206 and accompanying text. 
 477. See supra note 93 and accompanying text. 
 478. See supra note 203 and accompanying text. 
 479. See supra note 144 and accompanying text. 
 480. This was one of the Court’s fears in Ruiz. See supra notes 254–56 and 
accompanying text. 
 481. See supra notes 128–39 and accompanying text. 
 3646 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 81 
percentage of cases ending in guilty pleas482 and the importance of 
exculpatory evidence in the decision to plead guilty,483 disclosure of 
material exculpatory evidence is necessary to ensure fair and just plea 
bargaining. 
As recognized by the Ninth Circuit, the per se approach is justified by 
substantial policy considerations.484  First, the defendant’s appraisal of the 
prosecution’s case is crucial to an informed decision on how to plead.485  
When discussing the knowing and voluntary requirement for a valid guilty 
plea, the Supreme Court has repeatedly emphasized that the defendant must 
have “sufficient awareness of the relevant circumstances and likely 
consequences” of his guilty plea.486  This does not mean that the defendant 
must be aware of every piece of evidence, or every argument the 
prosecution intends to make; but it cannot be said that a defendant has 
sufficient awareness of the relevant circumstances if he pleads guilty to a 
crime without knowing that the prosecution possesses evidence establishing 
his factual innocence. 
Second, a rule to the contrary would incentivize prosecutors to withhold 
material exculpatory evidence in order to compel a defendant to plead 
guilty.487  Prosecutors are incentivized to obtain convictions,488 and as a 
prosecutor knows that her chances of securing a conviction will decrease at 
trial because she will have to disclose exculpatory evidence, she will be 
motivated to conceal that evidence in order to obtain a conviction through 
plea bargaining.489 
Third, it is naïve for courts and commentators to assume that innocent 
defendants will not plead guilty.490  Overcharging and mandatory minimum 
sentencing create an overwhelming pressure on defendants to plead 
guilty.491  In addition to the risk of harsher punishment, there are other costs 
incurred by a defendant who goes to trial, including attorney’s fees, time, 
stress and emotional harm, and the ignominy of having to publicly stand 
trial.492  The pressure to plead guilty is strong for both minor and major 
offenses.  For a minor offense, pleading guilty may be a way to avoid jail 
time; for a major crime, it might allow a defendant to avoid the death 
penalty.  While Rule 11 and jurisprudential safeguards theoretically prevent 
innocent defendants from pleading guilty,493 the reality is that a guilty plea 
is a rational choice for many innocent defendants. 
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When considering Brady challenges to guilty pleas, a court should 
therefore proceed as follows.  First, the court must determine whether the 
undisclosed evidence can be considered exculpatory.494  Second, the court 
must determine if the evidence is material by asking if there is a reasonable 
probability that the result of plea bargaining would have been different had 
the evidence been disclosed.495  If such a probability exists, the guilty plea 
is not knowing and voluntary, and is therefore invalid. 
C.  The Logic of Lafler and Frye Supports the Recognition of 
Exculpatory Brady Rights During Plea Bargaining 
Courts and commentators have frequently noted the link between the 
right to effective assistance of counsel and Brady rights.496  They are two 
sides of the same coin—concerning whether the actions of defense counsel 
or the prosecution during the judicial process violate the defendant’s 
constitutional rights.497  In addition, violations of both rights are asserted by 
defendants to challenge their convictions;498 they share the same standard 
of materiality, asking whether there is a reasonable probability that the 
result of the proceeding would have been different absent the deficient 
representation or suppression of evidence;499 and both were traditionally 
considered to be purely trial rights.500  Given the link between these two 
rights, it is unsurprising that much of the logic that supported the extension 
of the right to ineffective assistance of counsel to plea bargaining also 
applies to the question of pre-plea Brady disclosure. 
First, Lafler and Frye suggest that the assertion that Brady is a “trial 
right” will not preclude it from being applied during plea bargaining.  
Effective assistance of counsel was traditionally considered a right that 
ensured only a fair trial,501 but in Lafler and Frye the Supreme Court 
expressly rejected that argument.502  Instead, the Court found that 
guaranteeing the right to effective assistance of counsel at all “critical 
stages of the criminal proceeding” was necessary for the fair administration 
of justice.503  The chief concern of the Supreme Court in both Lafler and 
Bagley was ensuring a fair judicial process that results in just outcomes, not 
solely ensuring fair trials.504  This concern necessitates pre-plea disclosure 
of exculpatory Brady evidence, because just as a defendant “cannot be 
presumed to make critical decisions without counsel’s advice,”505 neither 
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can he be presumed to make an informed decision to plead guilty without 
material exculpatory evidence.506  As the Court has recognized that plea 
bargaining is a critical stage of the judicial process,507 and as it has 
suggested that exculpatory evidence is crucial to decision making at that 
stage,508 it is evident after Lafler and Frye that Brady’s traditional existence 
as a trial right will not preclude the recognition of exculpatory Brady rights 
during plea bargaining. 
Second, the Court’s recognition of the prevalence of plea bargaining—
roughly 97 percent of federal criminal convictions—supports the 
establishment of pre-plea exculpatory Brady rights.509  The Court in Frye 
acknowledged the State’s arguments that there is no constitutional right to 
plea bargaining, and that the right to effective assistance of counsel would 
be difficult to apply during plea bargaining.510  However, the Court found 
that these arguments were outweighed by the importance of plea bargaining 
to the criminal process:  the right to effective assistance of counsel is 
guaranteed by the Constitution, and it cannot be ignored during plea 
bargaining, which now represents virtually the entire criminal justice 
system.511  So too with Brady:  as the vast majority of criminal proceedings 
are resolved by guilty pleas, denying defendants’ Brady rights during plea 
bargaining would be to deny those rights at the only stage when they could 
actually be of use.512  The importance of plea bargaining therefore 
outweighs concerns of judicial efficiency and resource expenditure that 
accompany a pre-plea exculpatory disclosure requirement.513  Like the right 
to effective assistance of counsel, exculpatory Brady rights are guaranteed 
by the Constitution, and should not be afforded only to the tiny fraction of 
defendants who proceed to trial. 
Third, Lafler and Frye shoot down the argument that exculpatory Brady 
rights should not be afforded during plea bargaining because there is no 
constitutional right to plea bargain.514  The Supreme Court held in no 
uncertain terms that, while the prosecution is not constitutionally required 
to engage in plea bargaining, it is required to abide by the Constitution’s 
protections for defendants if it chooses to do so.515  If prosecutors do not 
wish to turn over exculpatory evidence, expend resources on pre-plea 
discovery, or risk giving away too much of their case, then they can abstain 
from plea bargaining.  But as the Court found in Lafler, once the 
government begins to enter into highly discretionary negotiations that will 
ultimately affect the defendant’s freedom, it is bound to respect the 
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defendant’s constitutional right to the disclosure of material exculpatory 
evidence.516 
Fourth, the standard of materiality that is used to review both Brady and 
ineffective assistance of counsel claims suggests that defendants should be 
able to assert post-plea exculpatory Brady claims.  In Lafler and Frye, the 
Supreme Court continued to apply the standard from Bagley, holding that a 
conviction must be vacated if there is a reasonable probability that, but for 
his attorney’s errors, the result of the proceeding—in this case, plea 
bargaining—would have been more favorable to the defendant.517  From 
this standard, it is evident that a guilty plea does not waive claims of 
constitutional deficiencies that materially affect a defendant’s decision 
whether to plead guilty.  Like deficient advice from an attorney, the 
suppression of material exculpatory evidence during plea bargaining 
impedes a defendant’s rational decision making and precludes a knowing 
and voluntary plea.518  Therefore, just as a guilty plea or a conviction must 
be vacated where the ineffective assistance of counsel materially affects the 
defendant’s decision to plead guilty, the same should be true where the 
prosecution’s suppression of exculpatory evidence materially affects that 
decision. 
Finally, Justice Scalia’s criticism that having to stand trial cannot 
constitute prejudice will not apply to post-plea Brady claims, because the 
suppression of material exculpatory evidence will rarely, if ever, lead to the 
rejection of a plea offer.519  When a defendant is deprived of exculpatory 
evidence, he views the government’s case as being stronger than it actually 
is, and is therefore compelled to accept a seemingly favorable plea offer to 
avoid trial.520  It is difficult to envision a situation in which the suppression 
of evidence establishing a defendant’s factual innocence would lead him to 
prefer trial over a plea to a lesser charge or sentence.  Pre-plea exculpatory 
Brady violations impel defendants to plead guilty, thereby depriving them 
of the “gold standard of American justice”:  a full criminal trial.521  Such 
violations cause substantial prejudice, especially when they lead innocent 
defendants to plead guilty; but this prejudice can be avoided by requiring 
the pre-plea disclosure of material exculpatory evidence.  Thus, while 
Justice Scalia bemoaned the “constitutionalization” of plea bargaining,522 
allowing exculpatory Brady challenges to guilty pleas is necessary to 
protect the constitutional rights of defendants and preserve the legitimacy of 
today’s plea-based criminal justice system. 
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CONCLUSION 
Given the importance of the rights at stake, the Supreme Court should 
address the viability of post-guilty plea exculpatory Brady claims.  Almost 
all criminal convictions are the result of guilty pleas, and yet while some 
defendants are provided with evidence establishing their factual innocence 
before they enter a plea, others must plea bargain without the benefit of that 
evidence.  The Supreme Court recently made substantial progress in 
protecting defendants’ constitutional rights by recognizing the right to 
effective assistance of counsel during plea bargaining.  In the interests of 
fairness, accurate convictions, and a just criminal process, the Supreme 
Court should continue that trend by requiring the disclosure of exculpatory 
Brady evidence during plea bargaining and holding that the failure to do so 
renders a guilty plea invalid. 
